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An Empirical Assessment of Empirical Corporate Finance 
Abstract 
We empirically evaluate 20 prominent contributions to a broad range of areas in the 
empirical corporate finance literature.  We assemble the necessary data and then apply a 
single, simple econometric method, the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, 
and Margolis (1999), to appraise the extent to which prevailing empirical specifications 
explain variation of the dependent variable, differ in composition of fit arising from 
various classes of independent variables, and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias 
and other endogeneity problems.  
 
In particular, we identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and 
manager-specific characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, 
financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, and performance.  Observed firm 
characteristics do best in explaining market leverage and CEO pay level and worst for 
takeover defenses and outcomes.  Observed manager characteristics have relatively high 
power to explain CEO contract design and low power for firm focus and investment 
policy.  Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in 
explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and capital expenditures, 
and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash 
holdings, and firm risk.  Including manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and 
manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt 
antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm focus.  In terms of source, 
unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion of explained variation in the 
dependent variable for executive wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, 
board size, and sensitivity of expected executive compensation to firm risk.  In contrast, 
unobserved firm attributes provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend 
payout, antitakeover defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings.  In 
part, these results suggest where empiricists could look for better proxies for what current 
theory identifies as important and where theorists could focus in building new models 
that encompass economic forces not contained in existing models.   
 
Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for conventional 
empirical designs in the various subfields.  Including manager and firm fixed effects 
significantly alters inference on primary explanatory variables in 17 of the 20 
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1.  Introduction, Framework for Analysis, and Overview 
We empirically evaluate recent, prominent contributions to a broad spectrum of 
areas in the empirical corporate finance literature.  We assemble the necessary data and 
then apply to each representative regression model the method of Abowd, Karmarz, and 
Margolis (1999, AKM).1  This approach allows the empiricist, through construction of 
“connected-groups,” to separately identify manager and firm fixed effects in a way that 
was not previously possible.  Using the AKM approach, we appraise and quantify the 
extent to which prevailing empirical specifications explain variation of the dependent 
variable, differ in composition of fit arising from various classes of independent variables, 
and exhibit resistance to omitted variable bias and other endogeneity problems.   
In one sense, our project is quite modest.  We apply a single econometric 
approach across various empirical studies.  This allows a relatively even-handed 
comparison of progress in the various subfields.  In other dimensions, our research thrust 
is ambitious.  It requires data collection and analysis for a large number of regression 
specifications.  It assesses empirical performance across a wide spectrum of subfields in 
corporate finance and, in a broad sense, indicates varying research opportunities for 
empiricists and theorists across those subfields.   
To be more specific, we select recent papers, each containing one or more 
regression specifications that are approximately representative of the current state of 
progress in a subfield of empirical corporate finance.  To assess current progress and set a 
benchmark for comparison, we re-estimate that representative specification using our 
                                                 
1 To our knowledge, Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) were the first to apply the connected groups method to 
corporate finance. 
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sample period with time fixed effects.  We then build on each benchmark specification by 
adding firm fixed effects alone, manager fixed effects alone, and finally, by using AKM, 
both firm and manager fixed effects.  Based on the version with all five classes of 
explanatory variables, we decompose variation in the dependent variable into the 
unexplained portion and the portions explained by each of observed firm characteristics, 
observed manager attributes, and time, firm, and manager fixed effects.   
Variation explained by observed firm and manager characteristics represents how 
successful empiricists are in explaining the dependent variable and provides evidence on 
the economic content and explanatory power of theory.  Moreover, to the extent that 
variation in the dependent variable is “explained” by the various fixed effects, and insofar 
as those fixed effects represent unobserved manager and firm characteristics, we will 
know more about the nature of our gaps in knowledge about the determinants of the 
dependent variable.  The attribution of that explained variation to unobserved manager or 
firm characteristics or to time fixed effects indicates to empiricists where to look for 
better observable proxies for factors that theory suggests are important and suggests to 
theorists where to focus new attention so as to identify additional economic determinants 
of organization structure, policy, or performance.   
The subfields and specific empirical questions in corporate governance we 
consider include: executive compensation (pay level, wealth-performance sensitivity, and 
risk incentives), board structure (independence, size, and leadership structure), and 
corporate control (usage of antitakeover provisions and propensity to be a merger target 
or bidder).  For payout policy we examine the propensity to pay dividends.  For financial 
policy, we examine book and market leverage and cash balances.  Specific aspects of 
investment policy we analyze are R&D intensity, capital expenditure, firm focus, and 
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firm risk.  Measures of firm performance we consider are ROA and Tobin’s Q.  Table 1 
stipulates the 20 experiments we perform and the published studies that provide the 
specific underlying benchmark specifications.  Table 1 also provides information on the 
dependent variable, other aspects of our analysis, and results.  Figures 1-6 comprise 
graphical representation, for all 20 empirical experiments, of benchmark goodness of fit 
and the composition of variation in the dependent variable attributable to each of the five 
classes of variables and to the residual.  Figure 7, in aggregating Figures 2-6, captures all 
of these results in one location.  Inspection of Figures 1-7 will give the reader an 
immediate sense for our approach and results.  For additional detail, see Table 1. 
By way of illustration and motivation, consider two sub-fields that have attracted 
substantial attention – managerial compensation contract design and capital structure.  
For the former, there have been numerous empirical attempts to explain compensation 
level, the sensitivity of managerial wealth to shareholder value (delta), and the sensitivity 
of expected managerial wealth to stock price volatility (vega).  The standard agency 
model (e.g., Mirrlees, 1976, and Holmstrom, 1979) is a conventional way to understand 
contract design and frame empirical work, particularly for delta.  While the essential 
characteristics of firms and managers identified in the agency model are not directly 
observable, prior studies employ a logical set of proxies for variables that should 
determine delta.2  Despite the power of the logic and the appeal of the proxies, the 
accumulated evidence is disappointing.  There is substantial variation in results across 
studies and explanatory power is poor, with adjusted R2 often less than 10% in early 
specifications for delta without firm fixed effects (Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Bizjak, 
                                                 
2 For the marginal value of effective managerial input or human capital on firm performance, measures 
include firm size, the ratio of market value to book value of assets, and R&D.  Proxies for managerial 
ability include tenure, age, and board seats.  Proxies for managerial risk aversion include age, gender, and 
tenure.   
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Brickley, and Coles, 1993).  Perhaps incentive alignment through contract design is 
particularly impervious to application of standard regression specifications and 
explanatory proxies.  Consider, instead, financial policy, specifically firm leverage.  In 
assessing the prior literature, Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) note that the adjusted 
R2 from traditional leverage regressions using previously identified determinants ranges 
from 18% to 29%, depending on sample period and the specification.  After 60 years of 
work on the topic, these fit figures do not seem to reflect great progress.   
Similarly, the results are mixed using recent specifications and our data.  As 
Figure 1 indicates, using observable firm and manager characteristics and time fixed 
effects, the Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) specification for book leverage yields 
adjusted R2 of 0.23 and the Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) specification for delta 
delivers adjusted R2 of 0.25.  In terms of comparative fit, Figure 1 shows that these two 
regression models and the subfields they represent fall in the middle, ranking ninth and 
eleventh among the 20 cases we consider.  At the top end, adjusted R2 is highest for firm 
risk as the dependent variable (0.48) and lowest when the specification attempts to 
explain the propensity to put in place a poison pill (0.07).  
To simultaneously assess sources of fit and suggest how researchers might do 
better, we re-estimate the benchmark specifications with firm and manager fixed effects 
included and identified by the approach of AKM (1999).  When we include all five 
classes of explanatory variables and the residual, firm and manager observables provide 
proportions 0.088 (Figure 2) and 0.006 (Figure 3), respectively, of total variation in book 
leverage.  Observed firm characteristics perform far better than observed manager 
characteristics.  This makes some sense, as capital markets, product markets, production 
technologies, and corresponding industry norms, along with tax policy and bankruptcy 
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law, are likely to be more important determinants of capital structure than manager 
characteristics.  Nonetheless, variation explained by observed proxies is low and 
including manager and firm fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 for book leverage to 0.74.  
The proportion of total variation in book leverage explained is 0.715 arising from 
unobserved (to the econometrician) firm and manager attributes in total, with firm fixed 
effects providing 0.511, second among 20 subfields (Figure 4), and manager fixed effects 
providing 0.209, eighteenth among 20 subfields (Figure 5).   
For executive wealth-performance sensitivity (delta), firm and manager 
observables explain proportions 0.125 and 0.052, respectively, of variation in delta.  
Including manager and firm fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.75.  For explained 
variation in managerial wealth-performance sensitivity, 0.629 arises from unobserved 
firm and manager attributes, with 0.598 contributed by manager fixed effects, first among 
20 subfields, and 0.031 from firm fixed effects, which is last among subfields.  Time 
fixed effects explain a small proportion, 0.010, of variation in delta (see Figure 6). 
These results help us understand what we do not know.  In the above two 
examples, either we utilize poor proxies for firm and manager attributes motivated by our 
models or we need new models.  For capital structure, researchers reasonably would 
concentrate on better proxies and new theories related to characteristics of the firm and 
the markets in which it operates, a conclusion that is reminiscent of Lemmon, Roberts, 
and Zender (2008).  The prescription is very different for contract design.  Researchers 
reasonably would work to develop better proxies for managerial attributes isolated in 
existing models and on new theories that identify other characteristics of executives 
relevant for contract design.  See the columns designated “C1: Delta” and “F1: Book 
Leverage” in Figure 7. 
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Our analysis makes possible the same style of discussion for all of the areas in 
empirical corporate finance that we assess.  In broad terms, estimated specifications 
without firm and manager fixed effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, 
corporate control variables, and capital expenditure, and best in explaining executive pay 
level, board size, market leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk.  Including 
manager and firm fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the 
best fit for dividend payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, 
board size, and firm focus.  In terms of source, unobserved manager attributes deliver a 
relatively high proportion of total variation in the dependent variable for executive 
wealth-performance sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of 
expected executive compensation to firm risk.  In contrast, unobserved firm attributes 
explain a high proportion of variation in dividend payout, antitakeover defenses, book 
and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings.  Again, these results suggest where 
empiricists would look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important 
and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces 
not contained in existing models.   
Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for 
conventional empirical designs in the various subfields.  It is widely known that when 
unobservable manager or firm heterogeneity is correlated with observable characteristics, 
regression specifications that do not explicitly account for such heterogeneity can 
produce biased coefficient estimates (e.g., see Kennedy, 2003, on omitted variables).  Our 
analysis indicates that this is a concern for at least 17 of the 20 areas of empirical inquiry 
in corporate finance that we assess.   
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Our results contribute to the literature in several dimensions.  First, the paper 
enlarges the empirical corporate finance literature by providing a relatively 
comprehensive empirical examination and comparison of overall empirical fit and 
sources of fit from observed independent variables across subfields.  In doing so, we also 
gauge the role of unobserved firm and managerial heterogeneities in determining 
important aspects of organization design, policy, and behavior.  Second, our empirical 
exploration of the economic content of the estimated manager fixed effects contributes to 
the growing literature on how unobservable versus observable managerial attributes 
affect corporate policy and performance.  For example, in the case of executive contract 
design, beyond managerial skill and risk aversion our analysis accommodates the notion 
that managerial attributes heretofore unmeasured or inaccurately measured, such as social 
capital, psychological traits, personality, genetics, and functional background, influence 
firm structure, policy, and performance.  Third, our analysis suggests where it is likely to 
be most productive for empiricists and theorists in corporate finance to allocate their time 
and effort.  Fourth, our approach allows us to assess the relevance of omitted variables 
and endogeneity for conventional empirical designs in the various subfields.  Including 
manager and firm fixed effects significantly alters inference in a number of instances. 
Please note that our primary intent is not to be critical of the current state of 
empirical corporate finance, in general, or of specific contributions to the literature.  
Rather, our analysis identifies substantial progress in some areas of inquiry but less in 
others and, in some instances, ascertains potential research opportunities and plausible 
ways forward for both theorists and empiricists.  Moreover, we are apologetic about not 
including many well-done and influential papers.  Based on time and data limitations, we 
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are constrained to evaluate a manageable number of subfields and a limited number of 
specifications. 
Section 2 describes the empirical methodology.  Section 3 discusses how we 
select the prior contributions to the literature upon which we build our analysis.  Section 
4 describes the data, variables, and summary statistics.  Section 5 frames the approach 
and suggests what one can expect from the analysis.  Sections 6-13 present the results for 
the areas of empirical corporate finance we examine.  Section 6 treats executive contract 
design, including delta, vega, and pay level.  Section 7 considers board structure, 
including independence, size, and leadership structure.  Section 8 analyzes corporate 
control, specifically the propensities to make a bid, receive a bid, or adopt a poison pill.  
Section 9 addresses financial policy, specifically book leverage, market leverage, and 
corporate cash holdings, while Section 10 examines payout policy.  Sections 11 and 12 
examine the role of firm and manager attributes not observed by the econometrician in 
determining aspects of investment policy, including capital expenditures, R&D intensity, 
firm risk, and firm focus.  Section 13 examines the “determinants” of firm performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA.  Section 14 provides discussion of last tests.  
Section 15 provides concluding remarks.  Again, for a preview of the results, please refer 
to Figure 7 and Table 1. 
 
2.  Estimation Methodology 
 We employ the group connection method of AKM (1999).  We provide here a 
brief description.  For illustration and more detail see Graham, Li, and Qiu (GLQ, 2011), 
who apply AKM to executive pay level, and Coles and Li (2016), who apply it to other 
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aspects of executive compensation structure.  See GLQ (2011) and Coles and Li (2016) 
for a discussion of method similar to that below. 
The simplest way to include fixed effects is to create a dummy variable for each 
unique combination of manager and firm (i.e. for each employment spell).  The “spell 
method” enlarges the feasible sample and addresses possible omitted variable bias, but it 
can only estimate the joint firm and manager effects and does not disentangle the two.  
Note that simply using firm dummies and manager dummies is insufficient for separating 
the effects.  If a firm has no managerial turnover, the two effects are perfectly collinear.   
This does suggest one way forward, which is to restrict the sample to cases in 
which the firm has at least one manager who has moved from one company to another.  
Potential difficulties with the mover dummy variables (MDV) approach include: 
selection bias from restricting the sample to movers only; small sample size arising from 
infrequent managerial turnover; and, computational difficulties from inverting a covariate 
matrix with many dummy variables.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003), for example, use this 
approach, their purpose being to examine whether unobserved managerial heterogeneity 
has power to explain return on assets, investment, leverage, and cash holdings. 
Relative to the MDV and spell approaches, the method of Abowd, Karmarz, and 
Margolis (1999) achieves separate “identification” of the firm and manager fixed effects 
but still retains a substantial portion of the sample.  The intuition is fairly simple.  
Consider a manager who switches firms once during the sample period.  The fixed effect 
for this manager can be estimated, as can be the fixed effects for the two firms that 
employed the manager.  Based on the firm fixed effects, the fixed effects for all other 
managers at those two firms can also be estimated, even if they did not move.  Removing 
all firms that never had a manager depart or arrive leaves groups of firms connected by 
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managerial transitions.  AKM (1999) prove that such connectedness is necessary and 
sufficient to separately identify firm and individual fixed effects.  Again, this approach 
restricts sample attrition to executive-years arising from firms that employ the same 
group of executives for the entire sample period.  Some manager mobility is the key 
ingredient that allows identification of both manager and firm fixed effects.  We report 
results using the AKM method.   
Firm and manager fixed effects represent characteristics that are unobservable to 
the econometrician.  Note that, for any unobserved factor to affect the dependent variable, 
at least one decision-maker must have at least some information on that attribute.  Write 
the dependent variable for firm i and manager j at time t, ijty , as:   
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
ijt it jt i j t jty F M                    (1) 
where the right-hand side is comprised of observable time-variant firm characteristics 
( ˆitF  ), observable time-variant manager characteristics ( ˆjtM  ), firm fixed effects ( ˆi ), 
manager fixed effects ( ˆj ), year fixed effects ( tˆ ), and residuals ( ˆ jt ).  Hat denotes an 
estimate of a parameter or a vector of parameters i indexes firms, j indexes managers, and 
t indexes time.. 
To provide a quantitative comparison of the relative economic significance of the 
classes of variables, we follow GLQ (2011) to decompose variation of the dependent 
variable (delta or vega) into five estimated components and the unexplained remainder.  
Based on equation (1), model R2 can be decomposed as: 
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2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆcov( , ) cov( , )
var( ) var( )
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆcov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , )
var( ) var( ) var( ) var( ) var( )
ijt ijt it jt i j t ijt
ijt ijt
it ijt jt ijt i ijt j ijt t ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
y y F M y
R
y y
F y M y y y y
y y y y y
    
    
   
 
    
         (2) 
Of course, 1 - model R2 is the proportion of variation attributable to the residual.   Figures 
2 – 7 report on the components of total variation attributable to the five classes of 
variables, per (2), with Figure 7 also including residual variation. 
Another comparison is based on the proportion of R2, explained variation, 
provided by each class of variable.  Normalizing the components in (2) gives: 
2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆcov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , )
, , , , .
var( ) var( ) var( ) var( ) var( )
it ijt jt ijt i ijt j ijt t ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
F y M y y y y
and
R y R y R y R y R y
    
         (3) 
Table 1 provides a comprehensive summary but with fit comparisons based on attribution 
of explained variation in the dependent variable, as in (3), rather that attribution of total 
variation (including the residual) of the dependent variable. 
 
3.  Representative Specifications 
To reduce the data requirements for our analysis and for brevity, we choose one 
published contribution to the literature in each area and, further, one or a small number of 
regression specifications from that paper, which we then re-estimate using the approach 
of AKM.  All else equal, we choose papers that are recent and also are as representative 
as possible of the prevailing, mainstream empirical designs in that subfield.  In addition, 
given the scale of our empirical undertaking, we favor specifications for which the 
required data are not too costly to obtain.  In most areas, multiple papers meet some of 
these criteria, though generally no prior paper dominates on all dimensions.  Accordingly, 
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we make some arbitrary choices in selecting benchmark papers and specifications.  It 
should be clear that this reflects pragmatism and the desire to manage data collection 
costs and other costs rather than a conclusion that one prior paper necessarily is a better 
product than another. 
The headings in Table 1 specify the full set of 20 sub-fields in empirical corporate 
finance that we examine and the corresponding contributions to those sub-fields that we 
select to build on and enlarge.  The table identifies the papers we emphasize, the 
particular specification we use as the benchmark, and the dependent variable.  We select 
20 different specifications (arising from 9 different papers) to duplicate and re-examine 
using AKM.  Again, the broad topic areas we consider are compensation policy, board 
structure, corporate control, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, firm 
diversification/focus, and firm performance.   
 
4.  Assembling the Samples  
We begin with all executive-year observations from Execucomp for firms with 
fiscal years ending from 1993 to 2013.  For a firm-year this includes up to five named 
executive officers (NEOs).  Firm-executive-year observations carry the subscript ijt.  We 
include the CEO, who is likely to have the most discretion, span of control, and effect on 
structure, policy and performance, but also include the other NEOs for the reason that top 
management team attributes tend to predict organizational attributes better than CEO 
attributes alone (Hambrick, 1994).  Including NEOs, to the extent they switch firms, also 
allows in more cases identification of the firm and manager fixed effects.  We exclude 
any observations without matching CRSP and Compustat North America data and, 
consistent with prior literature, we eliminate financial services and utility firms from the 
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sample.  The full sample to which the spell approach could apply consists of 14,137 
executive-year observations.  Restricting the sample to include movers only would reduce 
considerably the number of observations to 12,360.  The approach of AKM, which allows 
identification of both firm and manager fixed effects, generates connected subsamples 
that aggregate to 83,670 executive-firm-year observations arising from 1,517 firms and 
19,835 managers.  Otherwise, for some experiments, data limitations reduce sample size. 
We obtain corporate governance data from RiskMetrics Governance, director data 
from RiskMetrics Directors, daily stock returns and prices from CRSP, executive 
compensation data from ExecuComp, company diversification information from the 
Compustat Segment data, corporate bond information from Compustat Ratings data, 
information on institutional holdings from Thomson Reuters data, and all other financial 
items from Compustat Fundamentals.  For data on corporate control and mergers and 
acquisitions, we rely on SDC Platinum.  We follow Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2011, 
Appendix) in adjusting Execucomp data for reporting changes based on the 2006 
implementation of FAS123R.  For brevity, we provide variable definitions in the 
Appendix and defer any detailed discussion of specific variables until the relevant 
subsection.  Table 2 reports summary statistics.  Inspection of those statistics indicates 
that our dependent and independent variables are characterized by sample moments 
similar to those reported in the representative prior studies. 
The representative papers across the various subfields differ depending on 
variables employed, variable definitions, sample period, and thus sample size.  In our 
analysis, towards the objective of a cleaner comparison across empirical questions, we 
use the same core sample of firms and managers over a common period.  Some secondary 
variables, such as manager age and tenure, are often missing.  To maximize sample size 
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we define variables that indicate whether the variable is missing (= 1, otherwise = 0), and 
set the variable itself equal to zero when the indicator equals 1.  This procedure follows a 
number of recent papers, including Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Byoun (2008).   
 
5.  Remarks on What to Expect 
Recall that our analysis employs five classes of explanatory variables: observable 
attributes of firms; observable attributes of executives; year fixed effects; time-invariant 
firm fixed effects; and time-invariant manager fixed effects.  Observable attributes of 
managers and firms can vary through time.  The firm and manager fixed effects account 
for unobserved attributes of firms and managers that are stable through time.  These 
attributes can be those that are imperfectly represented by included observables, but also 
could be characteristics that would be important in models not yet tested or understood or 
in theories not yet identified or articulated.  Year fixed effects likely capture broad trends 
in the economic environment, such as macro conditions, and in unobserved firm and 
manager characteristics.  The residual accommodates what is left, such as time-variation 
in the idiosyncratic unobserved firm and manager attributes, nonstationarity in the cross-
sectional effect of observed attributes, as well as noise. 
The relative explanatory power of these variables should vary across research 
questions.  For example, one would expect managerial attributes, such as risk aversion, 
cost of effort, talent, general human capital, and firm-specific human capital to be 
important for the structure of managerial compensation and perhaps board structure and, 
firm performance.  To the extent that observables are good proxies for these underlying 
attributes, then time-varying manager characteristics should have high explanatory power.  
If observed attributes are poor proxies (for risk aversion or talent, for example), then 
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manager fixed effects are likely to have power.  This also is true for other attributes 
newly identified by theory but not yet tested and traits not identified or isolated by theory.  
For example, managerial fixed effects accommodate the literature that asserts that 
psychological traits (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; 
Hackbarth, 2008; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2009; Grable, 2000), personalities (Kaplan, 
Klebanov, and Sorensen, 2008), and functional background (e.g. Hambrick, 2007) 
influence firm policies and performance.  Along the same lines, executive fixed effects 
can capture social capital, interpersonal networks, charisma, ability to self-regulate, 
religious beliefs, and genetic makeup.3   
On the other hand, perhaps firm attributes, such as characteristics of the product 
market, cost structure, regulatory environment, asset base, and growth opportunities, are 
relatively more important for financial policy, such as aspects of the capital structure 
decision, investment policy, and perhaps firm performance as well.  Then observable firm 
attributes and firm fixed effects will have explanatory power, with the mix being 
determined by the quality of the proxies, the insight and predictive power of existing 
theory, and the elements of theory not yet tested or developed.  Of course, this is not a 
certain conclusion.  Managerial characteristics, such as risk aversion, also are likely to 
shape decisions on leverage (e.g., Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2010) and cash 
holdings.4   
                                                 
3 In this last respect, recent evidence suggests that genetic makeup has high explanatory power for job 
choice, satisfaction, and (poor) performance (Shane, 2010).  Other evidence shows that genes affect 
behavior through bloodstream levels of neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and dopamine, and hormones, 
such as oxytocin and cortisol (see Homo admistrans: the biology of business, The Economist, September 
25, 2010, pp. 99-101).  
4 A priori, managerial characteristics will not matter much in determining corporate policies if managerial 
discretion is lacking (Hambrick, 2007).  For example, manager fixed effects are likely to matter more for 
investment policy as compared to financial policy, supposing that investment policy is more centrally 
located within the span of managerial discretion and control and managers have flexibility to determine 
investment policy. 
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Overall fit, or the ability of all classes of variables combined to explain the 
dependent variable, also is likely to vary across subfields.  Some aspects of empirical 
corporate finance are more mature and better developed empirically and/or theoretically.  
In contrast, the residual error will be larger in subfields that are less developed and in 
which the unobserved attributes and dependent variable are highly variable through time.  
The study of capital structure was initiated some 60 years ago (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958), while the examination of the structure of managerial compensation is more recent 
(Holmstrom, 1979; Murphy, 1999).  Thus, one would expect less residual variation for 
leverage as opposed to compensation level.  Along these lines, Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2011) note that “…(I)t is well known that labor market outcomes are extremely 
heterogeneous and that observationally equivalent individuals sometimes earn markedly 
different compensation.” 
A final aspect of the analysis relates to how the inclusion of fixed effects can 
mitigate bias arising from omitted variables.  Accordingly, we examine whether the 
inclusion of firm and manager fixed effects changes coefficient estimates and statistical 
inference for primary explanatory variables identified by leading theoretical models. 
 
6.  Compensation Policy: Executive Contract Design 
We first consider compensation policy.  We present our analysis and also use this 
particular aspect of empirical corporate finance to illustrate our approach.  Accordingly, 
we present the results in more detail and with more discussion than will be typical in 
what follows.  Given the span of the empirical analysis, brevity requires a more 
parsimonious approach in subsequent sections of the paper. 
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Returning to compensation policy, the dependent variables we examine are pay 
level, the sensitivity of executive wealth to shareholder value (delta), and the sensitivity 
of expected executive wealth to volatility of shareholder value (vega).  Our point of 
departure for delta and vega is Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006).  We build on Graham, 
Li, and Qiu (2011) for pay level.   
Unlike all of the other subfields of empirical corporate finance we assess below, 
compensation policy is the only area to have been examined using the method of AKM 
(1999).  See Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011) on compensation level and Coles and Li (2016) 
for delta and vega.  Though we use different data and sample period and our 
specifications herein differ slightly from theirs, our results are similar to those in the two 
prior papers.  
Total compensation is TDC1 from Execucomp.  We follow Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006), who follow Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002), to calculate 
accumulated delta and vega for each executive on an annual basis.  Delta is defined as the 
change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth for a one percentage point change in 
stock price.  Vega is the change in the dollar value of the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 
change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns.  Because option vega is 
many times higher than stock vega (Guay, 1999), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) use 
vega of the option portfolio to measure the total vega of the stock and option portfolio.  
We winsorize delta and vega at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Please refer to the Appendix 
(Variable Definitions) for detailed definitions and Table 2 for summary statistics for these 
and other variables. 
6.1 Executive wealth-performance sensitivity (delta) 
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Our benchmark specification for delta, meaning the specification that we adopt as 
roughly representative of the prior literature, is a pooled OLS regression, including time 
fixed effects but without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the 
explanatory variables in the specification in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, 
Panel A, Column 3), which resembles Core and Guay (1999, Table 2, Model 1), plus 
other selected observable managerial attributes.  The estimates using our data and 
controls are reported under Model (1) in Panel A of Table 3.  The adjusted R2 is 0.25.  
Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.37 (Model (2)), while manager fixed 
effects alone boost adjusted R2 to 0.73 (Model (3)).  Model (4) includes both firm and 
manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.75.   
Panel B of Table 3 reports the relative explanatory power of the classes of 
variables.  Per equation (2), we calculate the covariances between dependent variables 
(delta and vega, respectively) and each of the components, normalized by the variance of 
dependent variable.  These percentages are the fractions of the model sum of squares 
attributable to particular components.  Applying the AKM method to delta with both 
manager and firm fixed effects (Model (4) of Panel A), observed firm attributes, observed 
manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects 
account for proportions 0.12 (ranked 4 among 20), 0.05 (3), 0.03 (20), 0.60 (1), and 0.01 
(12) of total variation of delta, with proportional residual unexplained variation of 0.186.  
Thus, unadjusted model R2 is 0.814 (Table 3, Panel B).  Normalized by variation of delta 
explained by the model (0.814 = 1.00 - 0.186), the five classes of variables contribute 
15.32% (= 0.124/(1-0.186)), 6.37% (= 0.052/(1-0.186)), 3.8%, 73.28%, and 1.23% of 
model R2, explained variation in delta, respectively.   
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Column C1 in Figure 7 represents graphically the components of total variation.  
For delta, and for all other dependent variables, orange represents the share of the 
residual in variation of the dependent variable, light blue is observed managerial 
characteristics, purple is observed firm characteristics, green is year fixed effects, red is 
firm fixed effects, and blue is manager fixed effects.  See Table 1 for sources of 
explained variation in delta.  
While the percentage of total variation in delta arising from observed manager 
characteristics (0.052) seems low in absolute terms, Figure 3 indicates it is the third 
highest among the 20 experiments.  Nonetheless, given the high explanatory value of 
time-invariant fixed effects (0.598, Figure 5), researchers would reasonably work to 
obtain better proxies for managerial attributes and to develop new theories that identify 
new managerial characteristics relevant for delta.  Along these lines, perhaps Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) and predecessors employ poor proxies for managerial ability 
and risk aversion.  Furthermore, perhaps they and other researchers would consider 
models that contain, as well as proxies that measure, for example, managerial reputation 
(Milbourn, 2003).  Such forces, or social capital, genetics, or personality, for example, 
may be sources of the “explanatory power” of manager fixed effects for delta. 
Table 1 includes information on whether including manager and firm fixed effects 
alters inference on other explanatory variables.   In the case of delta, the most important 
change is that including the fixed effects changes the coefficient on firm risk to negative 
and significant from positive and significant.  While a positive coefficient is consistent 
with numerous previous findings (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999, and Coles et al., 2006), the 
result is inconsistent with the predictions of the standard agency problem, ceteris paribus.  
In contrast, including firm and manager fixed effects yields a result that is quite different 
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from the pooled OLS result without fixed effects but is consistent with Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999, 2003) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) and the prediction of the leading 
model.   
It is plausible that including the fixed effects successfully addresses omitted 
variable bias.  For example, suppose firm risk has two opposing effects on delta.  The 
direct effect is suggested by standard agency theory where, all else equal, delta will be 
lower the higher is firm risk because delta exposes managers to risk.  The indirect effect 
is through employee-employer matching.  Risk-tolerant managers are sorted to high risk 
firms and those managers are willing to accept higher delta than more risk-averse 
managers.  The former effect predicts a negative relationship between firm risk and delta, 
while the latter suggests a positive one.  If manager fixed effects and/or firm fixed effects 
absorb the matching effect, the specification isolates the direct effect of firm risk on delta. 
6.2 Compensation Vega 
The benchmark specification we select for vega is a pooled OLS regression, 
without firm or manager fixed effects, that is based on Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, 
Table 3, Panel A, Column 2), which resembles Core and Guay (1999, Table 4, Model 4), 
plus other selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.28 
(Model (1), Panel A, Table 4).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.40 
(Model (2)), while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.47 (Model (3)).  Model 
(4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.49.   
As Panel B of Table 4 indicates, when normalized by variation of vega explained 
by the model (0.626 = 1 - 0.374), the five classes of variables (observable firm attributes, 
observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects) contribute 19.3% (0.121/(1-0.74)), 9.3%, 7.7%, 59.1%, and 4.6% of model R2.  
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See Table 1.  Column C2 in Figure 1 represents graphically the unnormalized (by model 
R2) components of variation.  
Risk aversion may be the most important determinant absorbed in managerial 
fixed effects.  Effort focused on finding better proxies continues.  For example, risk 
aversion can be proxied by cultural and political environment (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2004, 2008).  Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find individual experiences matter: 
in particular, “depression babies” exhibit lower willingness to take financial risk.  In 
addition, Bergman and Jenter (2007) link stock option compensation to employee 
optimism. 
Note that including manager and firm fixed effects yields a negative and 
significant coefficient on each of firm risk and market-to-book.  Again, it is plausible that 
fixed effects mitigate a common endogeneity problem by controlling for important but 
unobservable underlying drivers of both firm characteristics and executive compensation.  
6.3  Compensation level 
The representative specification (Model (1), Panel A, Table 5) we select for 
compensation level is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager fixed effects, 
which is based on the explanatory variables in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011, Table 4, Panel 
A, Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes and year fixed effects.  
Adding both firm and manager fixed effects improves adjusted R2 from the benchmark 
value of 0.35 to 0.67.  As Table 1 and Panel B of Table 5 indicate, normalized variation 
of total compensation explained is 20.2%, 10.9%, 8.3%, 47.1%, and 13.8% of model R2 
for observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects, respectively.  These results are quite similar to those 
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in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2011).  See column C3 in Figure 7 for unnormalized attribution 
of variation in pay level. 
In determining executive pay level, firm fixed effects are likely to represent, for 
example, complexity of the tasks that the executive faces in the firm and firm- (or 
industry-, region-, etc.) specific compensation practice.  Manager fixed effects plausibly 
reflect managerial ability and other manager-specific factors, such as reputation 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009).  In terms of possible bias from omitted variables, including 
manager and firm fixed effects alters inference for manager age and changes the 
significance of several other coefficients. 
 
7.  Board Structure 
 The conventional wisdom is that independent boards, smaller boards, and boards 
that separate the CEO and chairman positions are better boards (see Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2008, for discussion).  On the first of these, a greater level of board 
independence is thought to lead to effective monitoring and better firm performance.  
Indeed, some stock exchanges (e.g., NYSE) require that at least half the board be non-
employee directors.  Several studies show how outside (non-management) directors on 
the board affect discrete tasks, including hiring and firing of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) (Weisbach, 1988), adoption of antitakeover devices (Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 
1994), and negotiating takeover premiums (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  In terms of board 
size, Jensen (1993) suggests that larger boards could be less effective than smaller boards 
because of coordination problems and director free-riding. Yermack (1996) provides 
evidence that smaller boards are associated with higher firm value, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q.  On the other hand, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) suggest that advising 
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requirements and firm complexity can alter the balance of costs and benefits, so that 
bigger boards with more inside directors would be appropriate for some companies. 
 Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) found that nearly 81% of large US companies 
in 1988 combined the CEO and chairman positions in one individual.  Furthermore, they 
found no relation between firm performance and corporate leadership structure.  
Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom (e.g., the Conference Board) is that separating the 
positions is good governance and the recent trend has been towards separating the 
position, with nearly 40% of large US companies doing so more recently (Spencer Stuart, 
2009: respondents from the 2009 (as of May 15) S&P 500).  Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 
(1997) and Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) set forth the potential costs and benefits of 
combining and separating the positions. 
7.1 Board independence 
The benchmark specification (Model (1), Panel A, Table 6) is a pooled OLS 
regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory 
variables in Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008, Table 4, Column 2), plus selected observable 
managerial attributes and year fixed effects.  The dependent variable is the proportion of 
board members who are not executives of the company.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.25 
(Model (1), Panel A, Table 6).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.74 
(Model (2)), while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.73 (Model (3)).  Model 
(4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.76.   
As Panel B of Table 6 indicates, when normalized by variation of board 
independence explained by the model, the five classes of variables, observable firm 
attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and 
year fixed effects, contribute 2.6%, 0.8%, 27.4%, 59.7%, and 7.2% of model R2(Table 1).  
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Column B1 in Figure 7 represents graphically the components of total variation in board 
independence.   
Pertaining to the large explanatory share of manager fixed effects, there are 
several potential sources of managerial influence over board structure.  For example, the 
selection of directors is largely influenced by the CEO (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999).  
Consistent with the negotiation hypothesis in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Baker 
and Gompers (2003), Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) find board independence 
is negatively related to managerial influence.  Furthermore, if a manager is highly 
capable or influential, she will be elected into the board, potentially decreasing board 
independence, increasing board size, and increasing the likelihood of CEO duality if she 
is a CEO.   Manager fixed effects could capture the time-invariant portions of these 
factors. 
Firm fixed effects are also important in determining board independence.  This 
may reflect the likelihood that board structure is determined by scope and complexity of 
the firms operations (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Lehn, Patro, and Zhao, 2009) and 
is influenced by the specific business and information environment (e.g., Raheja, 2005; 
Harris and Raviv, 2008).  Furthermore, although board governance often is an important 
control system, it clearly is not the only one.  Firm fixed effects may capture some 
unobserved characteristics of other governance features that can supplement direct board 
monitoring.  Examples are shareholder activism (Gillan and Starks, 2000), mutual 
monitoring among executives (Acharya, Myers, and Rajan, 2011; Li, 2011), analyst 
coverage (Yu, 2008), regulatory environment (La Porta et al., 2000), accounting 
transparency, and auditing effectiveness , etc.  The regression residual may reflect the 
findings of Boone et al. (2007) that board size and independence increase as firms grow 
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and diversify over time, effects which cannot be captured in time-invariant fixed effects.  
Finally, we observe that including manager and firm fixed effects changes the sign on 
leverage from positive to negative, suggesting that leverage and board monitoring are 
substitutes rather than complements in production. 
7.2  Board size 
The base specification (Model (1), Panel A, Table 7) is a pooled OLS regression, 
without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables 
in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008, Table 4, Column 1), plus selected observable 
managerial attributes and year fixed effects.  The dependent variable is the number of 
directors on the board.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.39 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 6).  
Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.79 (Model (2)), while manager fixed 
effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.78 (Model (3)).  Model (4) includes both firm and 
manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.80.   
Column B2 of Figure 7 and Panel B of Table 7 indicate that, when normalized by 
variation of board size explained by the model, the five classes of variables (observable 
firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects) contribute 9.8%, 5.0%, 30.8%, 52.5%, and 1.8% of model R2.  
Including manager and firm fixed effects reduces the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients on CEO age and R&D intensity. 
7.3  Leadership structure: CEO duality 
The representative specification (Model (1), Panel A, Table 8) is a pooled logistic 
regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory 
variables in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008, Table 4, Column 3), plus selected 
observable managerial attributes.  The dependent variable is the logit-transformed 
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indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO and chairman positions are 
combined in one individual, and the value 0 otherwise.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.08.  
Relative to the results reported to this point, fixed effects yield a larger improvement in 
fit (adjusted for degrees of freedom).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0. 
62 (Model (2)), while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.65 (Model (3)).  
Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.68.   
Because of the nonlinearity in the logistic function, it is unclear how to generate 
the analysis of composition of fit.  Thus, we re-estimate a simple linear version of Model 
(4).  [Of course, while Model (5) includes both firm and manager fixed effects, it suffers 
from the defects that motivate the use of logit in the first place.]  Column B3 of Figure 1 
and Panel B of Table 8 indicate that, when normalized by variation of CEO duality 
explained by the model, the five classes of variables (observable firm attributes, 
observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects) contribute 9.2%, 0.8%, 31.1%, 55.9%, and 3.1% of model R-squared.   
A CEO who consistently performs well will be rewarded with the chairman 
position.  Other determinants may be manager’s reputation, credibility, charisma, and 
vision, all of which are typically hard to quantify.  On the firm side, board leadership may 
depend on organizational structure and firm-specific restrictions and policies. 
 
8.  Corporate Control 
 We consider the correlates of the likelihood of a company making a control bid, 
receiving a control bid, and putting in place an antitakeover device.  The primary 
specifications are probit.  Like the logit model for leadership structure, however, 
decomposition of fit requires that we also estimate a simple linear probability model. 
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8.1  Propensity to bid 
The dependent variable is one if the firm announces a bid in year t and zero 
otherwise.  The benchmark specification is a probit regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Harford (1999, Table III, 
Column 3), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 
quite low at 0.12 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 9).  Adding firm fixed effects increases 
adjusted R2 to 0.55, while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.56.  Model (4) 
includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.59.   
The linear probability model (LPM) is Model (5).  Column MA1 of Figure 1 and 
Panel B of Table 9 indicate that, when normalized by variation of propensity to bid 
explained by the model, the five classes of variables (observable firm attributes, 
observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed 
effects) contribute 4.6%, 0.6%, 36.1%, 57.9%, and 0.8% of model R-squared.5  Firm 
level attributes such as cross-firm social connections (Ishii and Xuan, 2010) and 
organizational form (e.g., conglomerate or single-segment firms, per Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2008) can affect acquisition propensity.  As for managers, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) show that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher under overconfident 
CEOs.  Note that both “empire-building” and “overconfidence” may lead to excessive 
acquisitiveness. The difference is that the former is a firm-level agency problem while the 
latter is manager specific personality. Overconfident managers believe that they are 
acting in the interest of shareholders.  If so, the standard incentive contracts, as controlled 
for in the regression, are unlikely to correct their sub-optimal decisions. 
                                                 
5 Manager fixed effects are prominent in this specification.  This is consistent with Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), who suggest that (in bidder regressions) the manager fixed effect could represent CEO 
overconfidence. 
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The large residual portion may reflect industry life-cycle (Maksimovic and 
Phillips, 2008) or industry shocks that Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Mulherin and 
Boone (2000) show to be significantly related to M&A activity. 
Comparing Model (4) with Model (1), the primary change due to the addition of 
firm and manager fixed effects is that the coefficient on the price-to-earnings ratio 
changes from significantly positive to significantly negative. 
8.2  Propensity to be a target 
The dependent variable is 1 if the firm is announced to be a target of a successful 
tender offer, merger proposal, or merger agreement in year t and 0 otherwise.  The 
benchmark specification is a probit regression, without firm or manager fixed effects, 
which is based on the explanatory variables in Comment and Schwert (1995, Table 3, 
Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Again, benchmark adjusted 
R2 is quite low at 0.07 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 10).  Adding firm fixed effects 
increases adjusted R2 to 0.56, while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.63.  
Including both firm and manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.63 (Model (4)).   
The linear probability model is Model (5).  Column MA2 of Figure 1 and Panel B 
of Table 10 indicate that observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm 
fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects contribute 0.8%, 0.6%, 32.7%, 
62.3%, and 0.6% of model R-squared, respectively.  Adding both fixed effects makes 
insignificant the coefficients on firm size and prior abnormal return. 
8.3  Poison pill adoption 
The representative specification is a probit regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Comment and Schwert (1995, 
Table 3, Column 4), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  The dependent 
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variable is one if the firm adopts poison pill in year t and zero otherwise.  Fixed effects 
are important.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is quite low at 0.07 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 
11).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.88 (Model (2)), while manager 
fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.89 (Model (3)).  Including both firm and manager 
fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.91.   
The linear probability model is Model (5).  Column MA3 of Figure 1 and Panel B 
of Table 11 indicate that observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed 
effects, and year fixed effects contribute 1.7%, 0.2%, 57.2%, 40.6%, and 0.2% of model 
R-squared, respectively.    
Comparing probit Models (1) and (4), adding both fixed effects changes the 
coefficients on a number of important variables.  The coefficient on each of the control-
shares-law dummy, price-to-earnings ratio, firm size, and CEO indicator all change from 
significantly positive to significantly negative.  The coefficient on market-to-book 
changes from significantly positive to insignificant and close to zero.  These results 
suggest that the omitted variables problem is likely to be present in models examining the 
use of antitakeover devices. 
 
9.  Financial Policy 
Capital structure has been a topic of significant interest since the beginnings of 
academic finance.  Numerous recent empirical contributions would be appropriate as for 
us to set forward as the benchmark model.  We base the leverage results below on 
specifications from Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), the reason being in part that 
they also suggest that firm fixed effects are important, particularly insofar as the fixed 
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effects capture unobserved time-invariant factors that generate surprisingly stable capital 
structures. 
 9.1  Book  leverage 
The benchmark specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008, Table II, Panel A, Column 3), plus selected observable managerial 
attributes.  The dependent variable is total debt scaled by firm assets. Benchmark 
adjusted R2 is 0.23 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 12).  Adding firm fixed effects increases 
adjusted R2 to 0.67 (Model (2)), while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.71 
(Model (3)).  Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 
= 0.74.   
As Panel B of Table 12 indicates, when normalized by variation of book leverage 
explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm 
fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, contribute 10.8%, 0.7%, 
62.5%, 25.6%, and 0.5% of model R-squared.  Column F1 in Figure 1 represents 
graphically these components of variation.   
These results are consistent with the results and conclusions of Lemmon, Roberts, 
and Zender (2008).  They find that corporate capital structures are stable over long 
periods of time and that this feature of the leverage data-generating process is present 
after controlling for firm entry and exit and for previously identified determinants of 
capital structure.  Overall, they show that much of the variation in capital structure is 
time-invariant and that much of that variation is not explained by existing empirical 
specifications.  This is consistent with Parsons and Titman (2008) and Graham and Leary 
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(2011) who suggest more work is needed to identify what is captured in firm fixed effects 
but are missing from our models.   
Compare Models (1) and (4) to discern the primary changes in empirical results 
from including manager and firm fixed effects.  The coefficients on log (sales) and the 
dividend payer dummy (and manager tenure) change from positive (negative) and 
significant to negligible and insignificant.  
9.2  Market leverage 
The dependent variable is total debt scaled by the sum of total debt and market 
equity.  The baseline specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008, Table II, Panel A, Column 6), plus selected observable managerial 
attributes.    Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.39 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 13).  Adding firm 
fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.77, while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted 
R2 to 0.76.  Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 
0.79.   
Panel B of Table 13 indicates that, when normalized by variation of market 
leverage explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager 
attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, contribute 
22.5%, 0.1%, 51.6%, 24.6%, and 1.2% of model R-squared.  Column F2 in Figure 1 
represents graphically these components of variation.   
These results and those for book leverage are consistent with the strong 
explanatory power for firm fixed effects reported in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender 
(2008).  Nonetheless, managerial fixed effects also represent a significant component of 
variation in both book and market leverage explained, which is consistent with the notion 
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that managerial characteristics, such as risk aversion, affect corporate financial policy 
(see Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2010).  Moreover, overconfident managers exhibit 
strong debt conservatism and pecking-order preferences (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 
2011).  Furthermore, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) show managers who have more 
control would keep leverage ratio low.  Other important factors are likely to be cost of 
borrowing as determined by credit risk, relationships with lenders, and the implicit 
interest rate.  In addition, firm culture will keep leverage and cash holding persistent over 
time (Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson, 2007). 
Comparing Models (1) and (4), the primary changes in empirical results from 
including manager and firm fixed effects are that the dividend payer dummy changes 
from small and insignificant to positive and insignificant, while significant coefficients 
on manager tenure, the CEO indicator, and the board seat indicator become small and 
insignificant.  
9.3  Cash holdings 
The baseline specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008, Table 3, Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  The 
natural logarithm of the cash to sales ratio is the dependent variable.  Benchmark adjusted 
R2 is fairly large at 0.41 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 14).  Adding firm fixed effects yields 
adjusted R2 of 0.80, manager fixed effects alone delivers adjusted R2 of 0.80, and using 
both gives adjusted R2 = 0.82.   
Panel B of Table 14 indicates that observable firm attributes, observable manager 
attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, contribute 
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17.0%, 0.80%, 51.0%, 28.8%, and 2.4% of model R-squared.6  Column F3 in Figure 1 
represents graphically these components of normalized variation.  Like book and market 
leverage, firm observables and fixed effects dominate manager observable and fixed 
effects. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) show industry median leverage is an important correlate, 
acting as a proxy for company specific intangibility, regulation, stock variance, and 
uniqueness.  Obviously, this proxy is so noisy that the firm fixed effects may capture a 
large portion of these factors. 
Comparing Models (1) and (4), including manager and firm fixed effects alters 
parameter estimates and inference in numerous cases.  Significant coefficients in Model 
(1) that are insignificant in Model (4) with both fixed effects are the director indicator, G 
index, cash flow volatility, and market-to-book.  Variables that become significant are 
firm size (-), R&D intensity (-), and manager age (-).  Omitted variables and other 
endogeneity problems may be a significant difficulty in the analysis of cash holdings. 
 
10.  Payout Policy 
 Like capital structure, the characteristics, determinants, and implications of 
dividend policy comprise one of the original areas of inquiry in finance.  Again, there are 
numerous candidates for the benchmark specification.  We select DeAngelo, DeAngelo, 
and Stulz (2006) as the source of our baseline specification. 
10.1  Dividend Payout Ratio 
                                                 
6 According to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), cash holdings are determined by cash flow risk rather than 
agency conflicts.  This would explain why firm fixed effects dominate manager fixed effects. 
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The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
pays out one or more dividends in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.  The benchmark 
specification is a pooled logistic regression, without firm or manager fixed effects, which 
is based on the explanatory variables in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Stulz (2006, Table 3, 
Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 
0.34 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 15).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 
0.93, while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.92.  Model (4) includes both 
firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.94.   
Our dividend payout variable is dichotomous, so we estimate the linear 
probability model using the explanatory variables from the logit specifications (see 
Model (5), Panel A).  Panel B of Table 15 indicates that, when normalized by variation of 
dividend payout explained by the model,  observable firm attributes, observable manager 
attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, contribute 
3.4%, 0.2%, 68.6%, 27.1%, and 0.7% of model R-squared.  Column D1 in Figure 1 
represents graphically these components of variation.  Like financial policy, firm 
characteristics and firm fixed effects dominate those for managers. 
Firm fixed effects may reflect market imperfections such as agency problems, 
asymmetric information, and taxes (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Firm culture can give 
rise to stable dividend policy through time (Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson, 2007).  The 
empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive and much of the variation across firms 
remains unexplained (see Allen and Michaely, 2003).  At the manager level, 
overconfidence (Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe, 2010) and political ideology (Hutton, Jiang, 
and Kumar, 2010) potentially are related to the propensity to pay dividends and, thus, 
would be captured by manager fixed effects.  Comparing Models (1) and (4), the primary 
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changes in empirical results from including manager and firm fixed effects are that the 
coefficients on both the ratio of retained earnings to total common equity and manager 
age change from significantly positive to insignificant and the coefficients on the ratio of 
total common equity to total assets and market-to-book change from significantly 
negative to significantly positive. 
 
11.  Investment Policy 
 Investment policy can focus on relatively tangible versus intangible assets, with 
the former perceived as less risky than the latter.  Thus, we examine capital expenditures 
versus expenditures on R&D and, ultimately, the determinants of firm risk. 
11.1  Capital expenditures 
The dependent variable is capital expenditure, net of sales of property, plant, and 
equipment, scaled by total assets.  The representative specification is a pooled OLS 
regression, without firm or manager fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory 
variables in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel B, Column 1) plus selected 
observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is quite small, with value equal 
to 0.08 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 16).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted R2 
to 0.62, while manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.61.  Model (4) includes both 
firm and manager fixed effects to yield adjusted R2 = 0.63.   
As Panel B of Table 16 indicates, when normalized by variation of capital 
expenditure explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager 
attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, contribute 
10.7%, 0.1%, 47.3%, 41.6%, and 0.4% of model R-squared.  Column I1 in Figure 1 
represents graphically these components of variation.  The relative power of manager 
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fixed effects versus manager observables is striking.  This suggests that developing 
models that isolate relevant manager characteristics and developing good proxies for 
those attributes would be good strategies. 
Theories define firm culture as well-established shared beliefs and organizational 
preferences (e.g., Kreps, 1990; Lazear, 1995; Hermalin, 2001).   Cronqvist, Low, and 
Nilsson (2007) find that firm culture matters for investment policy, such as capital 
expenditure and R&D investment, and that firm culture is not necessarily dependent on 
the particular CEO in place.  Interestingly, literature shows that managerial bias (Ben-
David, Graham, Harvey, 2010), overconfidence, personal education, employment history 
(scientific vs. financial) (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and political ideology (Hutton, 
Jiang, and Kumar, 2010) also have explanatory power for investment policies  
Compare Models (1) and (4) to discern the primary changes in empirical results 
from including manager and firm fixed effects.  Inference changes for three variables that 
come immediately to mind as likely to be important for capital expenditures, specifically 
compensation vega, surplus cash, and log(sales).    
11.2  R&D intensity 
The dependent variable is research and development expenditure scaled by assets, 
with missing values for R&D set to zero.  The benchmark specification is a pooled OLS 
regression, without firm or manager fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory 
variables in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel A, Column 1), plus selected 
observable managerial attributes.   
Note that benchmark adjusted R2 is substantially higher than for capital 
expenditures, with value equal to 0.28 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 17).  Adding firm fixed 
effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.77, manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.78, 
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and including both firm and manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.80 (Model (4)).  
As Panel B of Table 17 indicates, when normalized by variation of R&D explained by the 
model, observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, 
manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects contribute 12.9%, 0.1%, 51.8%, 35.2%, and 
0.1% of model R-squared.  Column I2 in Figure 1 represents graphically these 
components of variation.  Relative to the results for capital expenditures, firm attributes, 
those observed and unobserved, are more important for R&D intensity than managerial 
attributes.   
Giroud and Mueller (2011) show product market competition should be 
considered in determining the relation between governance and  R&D, CAPEX, etc.  This 
may be absorbed in firm fixed effects.  Nonetheless, their R-squared doesn't improve 
much when including proxies for product market competition.  Other factors absorbed in 
firm fixed effects may include industry- or firm-specific technology, productivity, and 
human capital. 
Compare Models (1) and (4) to discern the primary changes in empirical results 
from including manager and firm fixed effects.  The three significant compensation 
variables, vega, delta, and cash compensation, all become insignificant after firm and 
manager fixed effects are included.  Inference also is altered for book leverage, manager 
age, and the director indicator.   
11.3  Firm risk 
The dependent variable is the one-year standard deviation of daily stock returns.  
The representative specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006, Table 9, Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark 
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adjusted R2 is among the highest among all subfields examined in this paper, with value 
equal to 0.48 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 18).  Adding firm or manager fixed effects 
increases adjusted R2 to 0.81, while including both firm and manager fixed effects yields 
adjusted R2 = 0.83.   
As Panel B of Table 18 indicates, when normalized by variation of firm risk 
explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm 
fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, respectively, contribute 8.0%, 
1.9%, 45.2%, 17.6%, and 27.7% of model R-squared.  Column I3 in Figure 1 represents 
graphically these components of variation.  These results are noteworthy insofar that year 
fixed effects exhibit far and away the most power here as compared to all other models 
we estimate.   
It is intuitive that stock return volatility is largely determined by firm specific 
fundamentals, such as line of business.  Nonetheless, research also shows that managerial 
narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), ego, bias, experience (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996), and power (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2005) also affect risk-
taking and volatility. 
Comparing Models (1) and (4), including manager and firm fixed effects changes 
the coefficient on cash compensation from insignificant to negative and significant, and 
vice versa for manager age and the director indicator.  The coefficient on book leverage is 
significant in both models but switches from negative to positive. 
 
12.  Diversification 
While the extent of product market diversification can be viewed as an element of 
investment policy, we consider it separately because of the large volume of literature on 
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the topic.  We employ two standard measures.  The Herfindahl index is the sum of the 
squares of segment sales divided by the square of firm sales.  The Herfindahl index 
increases in firm focus.  We also use the natural log of the number of operating segments 
as reported in Compustat segment database.  This measure decreases in firm focus. 
12.1  Herfindahl index 
The representative specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006, Table 4, Panel A, Column 1), plus selected observable managerial 
attributes.  Benchmark adjusted R2 is 0.16 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 19).  Adding firm 
or manager fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.73 and 0.75, respectively, while 
including both firm and manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 of 0.79.   
Panel B of Table 19 indicates that, when normalized by the variation of the 
Herfindahl index explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager 
attributes, firm fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects, respectively, 
contribute 13.1%, 0.1%, 45.7%, 37.5%, and 3.5% of model R-squared.  Column I4 in 
Figure 1 represents graphically these components of variation.   
A firm may enter a new industry if the firm’s existing expertise and technology 
are easy to apply in this industry.  Other possible determinants are the company’s 
organizational structure and market position.  Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
find overconfident CEOs make more diversifying acquisitions.  Industry experience and 
diversity of the management team are other candidates for the explanatory power of 
manager fixed effects. 
Comparing Models (1) and (4), including manager and firm fixed effects changes 
inference on a number of variables.  The dividend cut dummy, prior stock return, 
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compensation vega, and manager age all change from significantly negative to 
insignificant.  Sign changes occur on cash compensation and sales growth. 
12.2  Ln(Number of segments) 
The baseline specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006, Table 4, Panel B, Column 1), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  
Benchmark adjusted R2 is a modest 0.21 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 20).  Adding firm 
fixed effects increases adjusted R2 to 0.73, manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 
0.75, and including both firm and manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.79 (Model 
(4)).  As Panel B of Table 20 indicates, when normalized by variation of ln(segments) 
explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm 
fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects contribute 11.7%, 0.5%, 
44.6%, 34.9%, and 8.3% of model R-squared. 7   Column I5 in Figure 1 represents 
graphically these components of variation. 
Comparing Models (1) and (4) reveals a nontrivial number of changes in 
inference arising from including manager and firm fixed effects.  Fixed effects alter 
inference for manager tenure, the CEO turnover indicator, the dividend cut indicator, 
sales growth, stock return, and the executive compensation variables.   
 
 
13.  Firm Performance  
                                                 
7 Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) note that diversification is associated with external corporate control 
threats, financial distress, and management turnover.  These factors are likely to affect the relative 
importance of firm and manager fixed effects.  
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The study of the determinants of firm value and performance has been a persistent 
and significant segment of the literature. 8   The performance measures we use as 
dependent variables are: Tobin’s Q, the ratio of the market value of the firm’s securities 
to the replacement cost of its tangible assets; and ROA, the ratio of net income to the 
book value of the firm’s total assets. 
13.1  Tobin’s Q 
The representative specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Mehran (1995, 
Table 4, Panel A, Column 4), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark 
adjusted R2 is 0.24 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 21).  Adding firm fixed effects increases 
adjusted R2 to 0.70, manager fixed effects boost adjusted R2 to 0.71, and including both 
firm and manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.75 (Model (4)).  As Panel B of 
Table 21 indicates, when normalized by variation of Tobin’s Q explained by the model, 
observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed effects, manager 
fixed effects, and year fixed effects contribute 5.5%, 0.4%, 43.6%, 48.1%, and 2.4% of 
model R-squared.  Column P1 in Figure 1 represents graphically these components of 
variation.  These figures are most notable in that unobserved manager attributes represent 
such a large proportion of explained variation.   
Managerial ability and risk aversion are obvious potential sources of the 
explanatory power of manager fixed effects.  Other possibilities are “integrity” (Erhard, 
Jensen, and Zaffron, 2008), reputation (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005), leadership 
qualities, vision, and professional network. Manager’s extra-curricular activities, though 
                                                 
8 Influential examples include Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) for 
Tobin’s Q.  See Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2011) for a discussion of performance-on-structure 
regressions. 
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seemingly irrelevant, may have connection with performance, such as home purchase 
(Liu and Yermack, 2007), public awards (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2009), marriage, 
children, family illness (Bennedsen et al., 2007).  Comparing Models (1) and (4) reveals a 
nontrivial number of sign changes in important coefficients.  From significantly positive 
to significantly negative are the coefficients on manager wealth-performance sensitivity, 
prior relative operating performance, and firm size (as measured by log(assets)).  Board 
independence changes from significantly negative to significantly positive. 
13.2  Return on assets 
The baseline specification is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects, which is based on the explanatory variables in Mehran (1995, Table 4, 
Panel B, Column 4), plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Benchmark adjusted 
R2 is 0.17 (Model (1), Panel A, Table 22).  Adding firm fixed effects increases adjusted 
R2 to 0.72, manager fixed effects boosts adjusted R2 to 0.73, and including both firm and 
manager fixed effects yields adjusted R2 = 0.76 (Model (4)).   
As Panel B of Table 22 indicates, when normalized by variation of ROA 
explained by the model, observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm 
fixed effects, manager fixed effects, and year fixed effects contribute 14.4%, 1.5%, 
52.0%, 29.6%, and 2.5% of model R-squared.  Column P2 in Figure 1 represents 
graphically these components of variation.  These figures are notable in comparison to 
the results above on Tobin’s Q, because relative explanatory power shifts towards 
unobserved and observed firm attributes instead of manager characteristics. 
Comparing Models (1) and (4) reveals a few important alterations in inference.  
The coefficients on board independence and scaled inventory plus PPE are no longer 
positive and significant but become insignificant. 
 - 43 - 
 
14. Additional Discussion 
 One obvious possibility is that the low explanatory share of explained variation 
for observed firm and manager characteristics and the poor overall fit (large residual 
variation) arise from nonstationarity through time of the estimated cross-sectional 
coefficients on observed manager and firm characteristics.  To test this notion, we re-
estimate each of the 20 empirical specifications including a sixth class of variable, 
namely the interaction of three or four of the primary observed manager and firm 
characteristics predicted by theory to be important with time indicators for each year 
(except one).  This allows the cross-sectional parameters for each of these primary 
observables to vary through time.   
 In all 20 cases the class of interactive variables typically provides less than 2% of 
explained variation of the dependent variable.  This class of variables subsumes very little 
of the explained variation of the other five classes of independent variables.  
Nonstationarity of the cross-sectional coefficients on observed manager and firm 
characteristics is not an explanation for poor overall fit and is not an explanation for the 
low explanatory power of observed manager and firm characteristics. 
 
15. Conclusion 
To empirically gauge the state of progress in empirical corporate finance, we 
apply the connected-groups approach of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) to 
identify and estimate the role of observed and unobserved firm- and manager-specific 
characteristics in determining primary features of corporate governance, financial policy, 
payout policy, investment policy, and performance.  The results allow us to assess the 
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extent of empirical progress in the various subfields in empirical corporate finance.  We 
consider a broad range of subfields.  They are: executive compensation (level, wealth-
performance sensitivity, and risk incentives); board structure (composition, size, and 
leadership structure); corporate control (usage of antitakeover provisions, propensity to 
be a merger target or bidder); payout policy (dividend payout propensity); financial 
policy (book and market leverage, cash balances); investment policy (R&D intensity, 
capital expenditure, firm focus, and firm risk); and firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q).   
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize our results.  Measured by fit, some subfields are 
more successful than others.  Estimated specifications without firm and manager fixed 
effects do poorly in explaining variation in CEO duality, corporate control variables, and 
capital expenditures, and best in explaining executive pay level, board size, market 
leverage, corporate cash holdings, and firm risk.   
When fit based on observable manager and firm characteristics is poor, our 
analysis suggests ways forward for theory and empirics.  Including manager and firm 
fixed effects, along with firm and manager observables, delivers the best fit for dividend 
payout, the propensity to adopt antitakeover defenses, firm risk, board size, and firm 
focus.  In terms of source of fit, unobserved manager attributes deliver a high proportion 
of explained variation in the dependent variable for executive wealth-performance 
sensitivity, board independence, board size, and sensitivity of expected executive 
compensation to firm risk.  A significant portion of what we know we do not know is 
related to time-invariant attributes of managers.  In contrast, unobserved firm attributes 
provide a high proportion of variation explained for dividend payout, antitakeover 
defenses, book and market leverage, and corporate cash holdings.  For these aspects of 
organization structure and policy, a significant portion of what we know we do not know 
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is related to time-invariant attributes of firms.  That is, our results suggest where 
empiricists would look for better proxies for what current theory identifies as important 
and where theorists could focus in building new models that encompass economic forces 
not contained in existing models.   
Finally, we assess the relevance of omitted variables and endogeneity for 
conventional empirical designs in the various subfields.  These problems appear to be 
severe in some areas.  
Figure 2 represents our attempt to place this paper in the literature.  The figure 
classifies research into four categories, using the topic of executive compensation as an 
example.  From left to right, the papers become less theoretical and more empirical.  This 
paper is located on the far right of the figure.  This is a purely empirical exercise, meant 
nonetheless to suggest to empiricists and theorists where there are likely to be productive 
research opportunities in empirical corporate finance.  
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Age Manager’s age in years   
Tenure Number of years of continuous employment with a firm 
Female A dummy variable with 1 for female and 0 for male 
CEO A dummy variable with 1 if the executive served as the CEO of the company 
for all or most of the indicated fiscal year and 0 otherwise 
Director A dummy variable with 1 if the executive served as a director of the 
company and 0 otherwise 
Mover A dummy variable with 1 for managers who switched firm in the sample 
period and 0 for those who did not 
 
 
Variables from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006): 
Variable Definition 
Delta The dollar change in the executive’s wealth for a 1% change in stock price 
Vega The dollar change in the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 change in standard 
deviation of returns 
Market-to-book The ratio of the market value of equity item minus the book value of 
equity plus the book value of assets to the book value of assets 
Firm risk The standard deviation of one-year daily stock returns 
Log (Net Assets) The natural log of Net Assets, where Net Assets is calculated as total 
assets less cash and short-term investments 
R&D Research and development expenditure scaled by assets 
Surplus Cash Amount of cash available to finance new projects, scaled by assets 
Board Independence The number of independent outside directors divided by board size 
Institutional 
Holdings 
The percentage of company's outstanding common shares held by 
institutions 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations divided by total assets 
PPE Investment in property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets 
CAPEX Capital expenditure net of sales of property, plant, and equipment, scaled 
by assets 
Leverage Book debt divided by book assets.  (i.e., book leverage) 
Sales growth Log(Salest/Salest-1) 
Cash compensation The sum of manager’s salary and bonus. 
Stock Return The stock return over the fiscal year. 
Herfindahl Index The sum of the square of segment sales divided by the square of firm sales 
Dividend Cut A dummy variable with 1 if there is a reduction in annual dividend and 0 
otherwise 
CEO Turnover A dummy variable with 1 if the CEO was replaced and 0 otherwise 
Ln(Segments) The natural log of the number of operating segments as reported in 
Compustat segment database 
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Variables from Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008): 
Variable Definition 
Board size The number of directors on the board 
Board independence The proportion of the board composed of non-executive directors  
Board leadership A dummy variable with 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board 
and 0 otherwise, which is also referred to as combined leadership or CEO 
duality 
LogMVE The logarithm of market value of equity 
Debt Total long-term debt over total assets 
LogSegments The logarithm of number of business segments 
FirmAge The number of years since the firm first appeared on CRSP 
MTB The market-to-book ratio of equity 
R&D R&D expenses over total assets 
RETSTD The standard deviation of the monthly stock return over the fiscal year 
immediately in the preceding fiscal year 
CEO_Own The percent of shares held by the CEO 
Director_Own The average percent of firm’s shares held by non-executive directors 
FCF Free cash flow (operating income before depreciation minus total income 
taxes, change in deferred taxes, interest expense, preferred dividends, and 
dividends on common stock) scaled by total assets  
Performance The average annual industry-adjusted earnings before interest and taxes 
scaled by total assets over the two-year period preceding the proxy date 
Lag(CEO_Chair) A dummy variable with 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board in 
the previous period and 0 otherwise 
 
 




The daily market-model abnormal return averaged over years t-4 through t-
1 
Sales growth The average sales growth over years t-4 through t-1 
Noncash working 
capital 
Net working capital (current assets - current liabilities) minus cash and 
cash equivalents, normalized by total assets and averaged over years t- 4 
through t-1 
Leverage The ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity, averaged over 
years t-4 to through t-1 
Market-to-book The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, averaged 
over years t-4 through t-1 
Price-to-earnings The stock price divided by earnings per share, averaged over years t-4 
through t-1. 
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Variables from Comment and Schwert (1995): 
Variable Definition 
Abnormal return The daily market-model abnormal return averaged over years t-4 through t-1 
Sales growth The average sales growth over years t-4 through t-1 
Liquidity The ratio of net liquid assets to total assets, averaged over years t- 4 through 
t-1 
Debt/equity The ratio of debt to equity, averaged over years t-4 to through t-1 
Control share law A dummy variable with 1 if the control share law is effective for the state in 
which the company is incorporated and 0 otherwise 
Business 
combination law 
A dummy variable with 1 if the business combination law is effective for the 
state in which the company is incorporated and 0 otherwise 
Poison pill A dummy variable with 1 if the firm has a shareholder rights plan in effect 
and 0 otherwise 
 
 
Variables from Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008): 
Variable Definition 
Book Leverage Total debt scaled by book assets 
Market Leverage Total debt scaled by the sum of total debt and market equity. 
Initial Leverage The first non-missing value for leverage in the Compustat from 1980 to 
2006 
Profitability Operating income before depreciation scaled by book assets 
Cash Flow 
Volatility 
The standard deviation of historical operating income, requiring at least 3 
years of data 
Tangibility Investment in property, plant, and equipment (PPE) scaled by book assets 




Variables from Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008): 
Variable Definition 
Cash Holdings The natural log of the cash/sales ratio 
Gindex The Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) antitakeover index 
Inside Ownership The equity ownership of the top five officers 
Pay Sensitivity Managerial delta 
Institutional 
ownership 
The percentage of intuitional equity holdings 
Size The natural log of total assets 
Leverage The ratio of total debt (short- and long-term debt) to assets 
Cash flow Earnings after interest, dividend, and taxes, but before depreciation, 
divided by assets 
Working capital The ratio of current assets net of cash minus current liabilities divided by 
assets 
CF Volatility The standard deviation of cash flows for the past five years 
R&D The ratio of research and development to sales 
CapEx The ratio of capital expenditures to net assets 
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Acquisition The ratio of acquisition to sales 
Dividend indicator A dummy variable with 1 if the firm pays out dividend in the fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise 




Variables from DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006): 
Variable Definition 
Dividend payout A dummy variable with 1 if the firm pays out dividend in the fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise 
RE/TE The ratio of earned equity (retained earnings) to total common equity 
TE/TA The ratio of total common equity to total assets 
Sales growth Log(Salest/Salest-1) 
 
 
Variables from Mehran (1995): 
Variable Definition 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the market value of the firm’s securities to the replacement 
cost of its tangible assets 
ROA The ratio of net income to the book value of the firm’s total assets 
% of managers’ 
equity compensation 
The ratio of the sum of the value of awards from grants of new stock 
options, restricted stocks, phantom stocks, and performance shares to 
total compensation 
% of shares held by 
all outside 
blockholders 
The sum of the percentages of equity held by individual investors, 
institutional investors, and corporations who own at least 5% of the 
common stock of the company 
% of outside directors The percentage of outside board directors who are neither top executives, 
retired executives, or former executives of the company nor relatives of 
the CEO 
Std of % change in 
operating income 
Measured with annual data in the proceeding five years 
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Figure 1 
This figure reports the adjusted R2 of each the regressions based on observed firm and manager characteristics with time fixed effects only versus regressions based on observed 
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Figure 2 
This figure reports the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to observable firm characteristics in the regressions including all five classes of RHS variables: 
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Figure 3 
This figure reports the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to observable manager characteristics in the regressions including all five classes of RHS variables: 







 - 58 - 
Figure 4 
This figure reports the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to unobserved firm characteristics in the regressions including all five classes of RHS variables: 
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Figure 5 
This figure reports the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to unobserved manager characteristics in the regressions including all five classes of RHS variables: 
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Figure 6 
This figure reports the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to year fixed effects in the regressions including all five classes of RHS variables: observable firm 
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Figure 7 
This figure reports the share in variation of the dependent variable of the five classes of variables and the residual.  These components are the fractions of the model 
sum of squares attributable to particular components.  Applying the connected groups method of Abowd, Karmarz, and Margolis (1999) allows separation of firm and 
manager fixed effects.  In addition to the residual, the five remaining classes of variables are observable firm attributes, observable manager attributes, firm fixed 
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Figure 8  
A taxonomy for placing this paper relative to others, using the example of research on executive compensation. 
 
 
Theory  → Theory and Then → 
Empirics 
←   Empirics Supported by 
Theory 
←    Primarily Empirical  
Modeling designed to 
describe/capture economic 
forces and associated 
outcomes/predictions 
Modeling with direct empirical 
application to examine the 
efficacy of the model and 
whether the model 
indentifies/captures relevant 
economic features of the 
problem 
Empirical work supported with 
substantial/rigorous modeling 
in mathematical or other form. 
Empirical experiments with the 
empirical design driven by 
conventional wisdom or 
guidance from prior literature 





Coles/ Daniel/Naveen (2006) Jensen/Murphy (1990); Guay 
(1999) 
   This paper resides here.  The 
intention is to provide useful 
guidance across the other three 
categories. 
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Table 1 
Summary of results: an empirical examination of empirical corporate finance.  NA = not applicable.  Composition of total variation in the dependent variable 
attributable to (six) variable classes is reported as proportions.  Composition of explained variation in the dependent variable attributable to (five) variable classes is 
reported as percentages. 
 














T 3/P A/C 3) 
Coles/Daniel/ 
Naveen (2006/ 
T 3/P A/C 2) 
Graham/Li/Qiu 
(2011/T 4/P A/C 
1) 
Linck/Netter/Yang 
(2008/T 4/C 2) 
Linck/Netter/Yang 
(2008/T 4/M 1) 
Linck/Netter/Yang 
(2008/T 4/M 3) 
N; Adj. R2 5,352; 0.48 5,352; 0.20 65,421; 0.49 8,840; 0.17 10,636; 0.44 3,610; 0.116 
Data Years 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2006 1990-2004 1990-2004 1990-2004 
Dependent Variable CEO ln(delta) CEO vega log(executive total 
pay) 
Board independence Board size Board leadership 
Notes Industry year  FE   Industry, year FE Industry, year FE Industry, year FE 
Our Sample Based on AKM Connected Group Method (Data years 1993-2013) 
Sample Size 83,670 83,670 83,670 36,745 36,745 30,891 
Dep. Variable NEO delta NEO vega NEO total pay Board Independence Board Size Board leadership 
Adj.R2: No FEs 0.25 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.39 0.08 
Adj. R2: Mgr and 
Firm FEs 
0.75 0.49 0.67 0.75 0.80 0.48 
Proportion of Total Variation Explained (Rank)/Proportion of Explained Variation Explained: 
Manager Attributes 0.052 (3)/6.37% 0.058 (2)/9.27% 0.081 (1)/10.90% 0.007 (7)/0.84% 0.044 (4)/5.02% 0.005 (10)/0.78% 
Firm Attributes 0.124 (4)/15.32% 0.121 (4)/19.32% 0.150 (2)/20.19% 0.022 (18)/2.63% 0.086 (11)/9.81% 0.060 (14)/9.23% 
Year FEs 0.010 (12)/1.23% 0.029 (6)/4.62% 0.100 (2)/13.46% 0.060 (4)/7.22% 0.016 (11)/1.82% 0.020 (9)/3.08% 
Manager FEs 0.598 (1)/73.28% 0.370 (5)/59.10% 0.350 (8)/47.10% 0.514 (2)/59.70% 0.460 (3)/52.50% 0.363 (6)/55.85% 
Firm FEs 0.031 (20)/3.80% 0.048 (19)/7.67% 0.062 (18)/8.34% 0.228 (14)/27.44% 0.270 (13)/30.82% 0.202 (15)/31.08% 
Residual 0.186 (7)/NA 0.374 (3)/NA 0.257 (5)/NA 0.169 (10)/NA 0.124 (16)/NA 0.350 (4)/NA 
Changes in 
Inference? 
Firm risk, board 
independence 
Age, R&D, firm 
risk, market-to-
book 
Age, R&D Debt, firm age   
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M&A Bidder M&A Target Takeover 
Protections (Pill) 




(1995/T 3/C 1) 
Comment/Schwert 
(1995/T 3/C 3) 
Lemmon/Roberts/ 
Zender (2008/ 
T II/P A/C 3) 
Lemmon/Roberts/ 
Zender (2008/ 
T II/P A/C 6) 
Harford/Mansi/ 
Maxwell (2008/ 
T 3/C 1) 
N; Adj. R2 2,857 21,869 21,871 117,914;0.30 117,300 11,645;0.47 
Data Years 1991-93 1977-1991 1977-1991 1965-2003 1965-2003 1993-2004 
Dependent Variable Bidder Target Poison pill Book Leverage Market Leverage Cash holdings 
Notes  Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE  
Our Sample Based on AKM Connected Group Method (Data years 1993-2013) 
Sample Size 64,428 48,365 48,365 73,629 73,629 63,698 
Dep. Variable Bidder Target Poison pill Book Leverage Market Leverage Cash holdings 
Adj.R2:  No Fixed 
Effects 
0.12 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.39 0.41 
Adj. R2: Mgr and Firm 
FEs 
0.58 0.63 0.91 0.74 0.79 0.82 
Proportion of Total Variation Explained (Rank)/Proportion of Explained Variation Explained: 
Manager Attributes 0.003 (12)/0.57% 0.003 (14)/0.64% 0.002 (14)/0.23% 0.006 (9)/0.73% 0.001 (17)/0.13% 0.007 (8)/0.80% 
Firm Attributes 0.024 (17)/4.59% 0.005 (20)/0.75% 0.015 (19)/1.70% 0.088 (10)/10.76% 0.191 (1)/22.50% 0.148 (3)/17.03% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.004 (15)/0.76% 0.004 (15)/0.60% 0.002 (19)/0.23% 0.004 (17)/0.49% 0.010 (12)/1.17% 0.021 (7)/2.42% 
Manager Fixed Effects 0.303 (11)/57.93% 0.293 (14)/62.34% 0.356 (8)/40.60% 0.209 (18)/25.55% 0.209 (19)/24.62% 0.250 (15)/28.77% 
Firm Fixed Effects 0.189 (16)/36.14% 0.165 (17)/32.67% 0.50 (3)/57.24% 0.511 (2)/62.47% 0.438 (6)/51.57% 0.443(4)/50.97% 
Residual 0.477 (2)/NA 0.530 (1)/NA 0.123 (18)/NA 0.182 (7)/NA 0.151 (12)/NA 0.131 (17)/NA 
Changes in Inference?  Poison pill Control share law, 
PE, size, CEO 
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Dividend Payout Capital Expenditure R&D Firm risk 
DeAngelo/ 




T 3/P B/C 1) 
Coles/Daniel/ 
Naveen (2006/ 
T 3/P A/C 1) 
Coles/Daniel/Naveen  (2006/ 
T 9/C 1) 
N; Adj. R2  9,422; 0.29 9,551; 0.39 9,689; 0.39 
Data Years 1973-2002 1992-2002 1992-2002 1992-2002 
Dependent Variable Dividend Payout CAPEX R&D Firm risk 
Notes Industrial firms Industry FE Industry FE Industry FE 
Our Sample Based on AKM Connected Group Method (Data years 1993-2013) 
Sample Size 31,980 46,103 68,924 67,846 
Dep. Variable Dividend Payout CAPEX R&D Firm risk 
Adj.R2:  No FEs 0.34 0.08 0.28 0.48 
Adj. R2: Mgr and Firm 
FEs 
0.94 0.63 0.80 0.83 
Proportion of Total Variation Explained (Rank)/Proportion of Explained Variation Explained: 
Manager Attributes 0.002 (16)/0.22% 0.001 (18)/0.13% 0.001 (19)/0.12% 0.013 (5)/1.85% 
Firm Attributes 0.031 (16)/3.41% 0.080 (12)/10.67% 0.110 (8)/12.87% 0.070 (13)/7.96% 
Year FEs 0.006 (14)/0.67% 0.003 (18)/0.40% 0.001 (20)/0.12% 0.244 (1)/27.67% 
Manager FEs 0.246 (16)/27.12% 0.312 (10)/41.60% 0.301 (12)/35.20% 0.155 (20)/17.63% 
Firm FEs 0.622 (1)/68.58% 0.355 (12)/47.33% 0.442 (5)/51.70% 0.397 (8)/45.16% 
Residual 0.093 (20)/NA 0.250 (6)/NA 0.145 (13)/NA 0.121 (19)/NA 
Changes in Inference? TE/TA, MTB Vega, Surplus cash Book Leverage Book Leverage, director 
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Herfindahl Index ln(segments) Valuation Ratio (Tobin’s Q) Accounting (ROA) 
Coles/Daniel/Naveen (2006/ 
T 4/P A/C 1) 
Coles/Daniel/Naveen (2006/ 
T 4/P B/C 1) 
Mehran (1995/ 
T 4/P A/C 4) 
Mehran (1995/ 
T 4/P B/C 4) 
N; Adj. R2 4,219; 0.29 4,220; 0.32 153; 0.43 153; 0.30 
Data Years 1992-2002 1992-2002 1979-1980 1979-1980 
Dependent Variable Herfindahl Index ln(segments) Tobin's Q ROA 
Notes Industry FE Industry FE manufacturing firms manufacturing firms 
Our Sample Based on AKM Connected Group Method (Data years 1993-2013) 
Sample Size 61,825 61,825 31,918 31,918 
Dep. Variable Herfindahl Index ln(segments) Tobin's Q ROA 
Adj.R2:  No FEs 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.17 
Adj. R2: Mgr and Firm 
FEs 
0.79 0.79 0.74 0.76 
Proportion of Total Variation Explained (Rank)/Proportion of Explained Variation Explained: 
Manager Attributes 0.001 (17)/0.12% 0.004 (11)/0.49% 0.003 (12)/0.36% 0.012 (6)/1.45% 
Firm Attributes 0.112 (7)/13.13% 0.100 (9)/11.72% 0.045 (14)/5.45% 0.119 (6)/14.42% 
Year FEs 0.030 (6)/3.52% 0.071 (3)/8.32% 0.020 (8)/2.42% 0.021 (8)/2.54% 
Manager FEs 0.320 (9)/37.51% 0.298 (13)/34.94% 0.397 (4)/48.12% 0.244 (16)/29.57% 
Firm FEs 0.390 (9)/45.72% 0.380 (10)/44.55% 0.360 (11)/43.63% 0.429 (6)/52.00% 
Residual 0.147 (14)/NA 0.147 (15)/NA 0.175 (9)/NA 0.175 (11)/NA 
Changes in Inference? Vega, Cash compensation, 
Sales growth, Age 
Cash compensation, Sales 
growth, Age 
Delta, % ind directors. Stdev 










This table presents summary statistics for the full sample of the cross-sectional yearly data from 1993 to 2013.  Refer to 
the Appendix (Variable Definitions).  All dollar values are stated in 2013 dollars.  Delta is in $millions for a 1 % change 
in equity value, vega is in $millions per 0.01 change in standard deviation of stock return, and total compensation and net 
assets are in $millions.  Vega, delta, total compensation, and market-to-book are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
levels.  The number of executive-year observations with no missing data values is 104,260 for the spell sample, 9,816 for 
the MDV sample, and 64,245 for the AKM sample. 
 
  Mean Median Stdev 
Managerial Attributes    
Age 52 51 7.85 
Tenure 10 5 10.66 
Female 0.06 0 0.24 
CEO 0.16 0 0.36 
Director 0.28 0 0.45 
Mover 0.15 0 0.37 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) Variables    
Delta ($ mil) 0.23 0.04 0.60 
Vega ($ mil) 0.05 0.01 0.09 
Market-to-book 1.98 1.35 2.52 
Firm risk 2.81 2.70 0.94 
Log (Net Assets) 5.94 6.22 2.88 
R&D 0.03 0 0.10 
Surplus Cash 0.10 0.08 0.15 
Board Independence 70.13 72.73 16.67 
Institutional Holdings 56.84 60.10 22.80 
ROA 0.13 0.10 0.14 
PPE 0.27 0.18 0.26 
CAPEX 0.05 0.03 0.07 
Leverage 0.17 0.12 0.17 
Sales growth 0.09 0.06 0.30 
Cash compensation 0.75 0.50 1.10 
Stock Return 0.01 0.001 0.55 
Herfindahl Index 0.80 1.00 0.27 
Dividend Cut 0.26 0 0.40 
CEO Turnover 0.16 0 0.36 
Ln(Segments) 0.48 0 0.03 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) Variables    
Board size 9.60 9 2.79 
Board leadership 0.80 1 0.40 
LogMVE 7.10 6.95 1.61 
Debt 0.20 0.18 0.15 
FirmAge 11.22 7.00 12.10 
RETSTD 0.41 0.36 0.21 
CEO_Own 0.53 0.07 0.27 
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Director_Own 0.96 0.90 0.83 
FCF 0.08 0.06 0.10 
Performance 0.004 0.004 0.02 
Lag(CEO_Chair) 0.77 1 0.38 
Harford (1999) Variables    
Bidder 0.14 0 0.32 
Abnormal return 0.01 0.001 0.45 
Noncash working capital 0.01 0.002 0.10 
Price-to-earnings 15.93 14.61 14.02 
Size 7.40 7.33 1.61 
Comment and Schwert (1995) Variables    
Target 0.02 0 0.14 
Liquidity 0.10 0.03 0.10 
Debt/equity 0.20 0.20 0.17 
Control share law 0.18 0 0.33 
Business combination law 0.70 1 0.45 
Poison pill 0.63 1 0.45 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) Variables    
Initial book leverage 0.20 0.19 0.19 
Initial market leverage 0.20 0.16 0.20 
Profitability 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Tangibility 0.28 0.25 0.20 
Dividend Payer 0.55 1 0.44 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) Variables    
Cash Holdings -2.68 -2.54 1.62 
Gindex 9.20 9.00 2.70 
Inside Ownership 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Size 7.35 7.22 1.48 
Working capital 0.08 0.06 0.18 
CF Volatility 0.05 0.03 0.05 
R&D 0.03 0 0.10 
CapEx 0.05 0.03 0.07 
Acquisition 0.03 0 0.06 
Dividend indicator 0.55 1 0.44 
Bond indicator 0.59 1 0.49 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) Variables    
Dividend payout 0.55 1 0.46 
RE/TE 0.42 0.03 0.23 
TE/TA 0.56 0.40 0.61 
Sales growth 0.09 0.06 0.30 
Mehran (1995) Variables    
Tobin’s Q 2.16 1.67 2.70 
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% of managers’ equity compensation 0.56 0.60 0.23 
% of shares held by all outside blockholders 0.17 0 0.30 
% of outside directors 0.70 0.72 0.17 
Std of % change in operating income 0.43 0.33 0.34 
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Table 3 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Delta – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing managerial delta on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Panel A, Column 3 in Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of delta explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  




(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
 (no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Tenure 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.000 
 (29.31) (30.97) (7.28) (0.30) 
     
Age 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (6.28) (10.84) (11.24) (11.55) 
     
Female -0.031*** -0.038*** N/A N/A 
 (-3.44) (-3.70)   
     
CEO 0.248*** 0.250*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 
 (32.63) (35.08) (14.81) (13.22) 
     
Director 0.220*** 0.194*** 0.076*** 0.056*** 
 (29.40) (26.69) (10.35) (7.28) 
     
Surplus Cash -0.112*** -0.130*** -0.088*** -0.050* 
 (-5.18) (-4.94) (-3.79) (-1.80) 
     
Leverage -0.205*** -0.140*** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 (-18.11) (-8.59) (-10.87) (-10.24) 
     
R & D -0.049** -0.147*** -0.052** -0.057** 
 (-2.07) (-3.48) (-1.96) (-1.97) 
     
Market-to-Book 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
 (70.15) (36.24) (42.65) (42.01) 
     
Firm Risk 0.186*** -0.122*** -0.071*** -0.127*** 
 (11.21) (-4.81) (-3.97) (-5.50) 
     
Board 
Independence -0.233*** 0.068*** 0.005 0.010 
 (-13.91) (3.27) (0.33) (0.81) 
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Institutional 
Holdings -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-5.33) (-0.66) (-0.58) (-0.18) 
     
Log(NetAssets) 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.120*** 0.152*** 
 (60.57) (23.05) (38.80) (38.80) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.37 0.73 0.75 
     









componentdelta   % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.031 3.80% 
Manager Fixed Effects 0.598 73.28% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.010 1.23% 
Residual 0.186  
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Table 4 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Vega – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing managerial vega on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Panel A, Column 2 in Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of vega explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 




(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
 (no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Tenure 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (5.14) (7.25) (4.16) (4.15) 
     
Age -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-8.89) (-5.17) (4.13) (3.90) 
     
Female -0.005 -0.005*** N/A N/A 
 (-1.04) (-3.20)   
     
CEO 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (36.25) (37.01) (17.68) (15.87) 
     
Director 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (24.17) (23.51) (14.08) (12.00) 
     
Surplus Cash 0.014*** -0.010* 0.002 0.000 
 (4.06) (-1.90) (0.68) (0.11) 
     
Leverage -0.035*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.015*** 
 (-16.87) (-5.56) (-5.22) (-4.98) 
     
R & D 0.090*** 0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 (19.76) (0.90) (-0.87) (-0.92) 
     
Market-to-Book 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (33.47) (3.15) (0.10) (-2.33) 
     
Firm Risk 0.008 -0.050*** -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (1.49) (-12.18) (-7.70) (-7.81) 
     
Board 
Independence 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (4.63) (4.52) (3.88) (4.10) 
     
Institutional -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
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Holdings 
 (-2.77) (-0.94) (-0.73) (0.57) 
     
Log (NetAssets) 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (98.01) (35.91) (28.41) (23.68) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.40 0.47 0.49 
     









componentvega   % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.048 7.67% 
Manager Fixed Effects 0.370 59.10% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.029 4.62% 
Residual 0.374  
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Table 5 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Executive Pay Level – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing executive total compensation on observable managerial and 
firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and 
firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 4, Panel A, Column 1 in Graham, Li, 
and Qiu (2011) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of pay level explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  




(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
 (no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 




Tenure -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.014*** 0.001 
 (-9.16) (-3.44) (-2.41) (0.08) 
     
Age -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 
 (-6.90) (-3.46) (5.94) (5.42) 
     
Female -0.028 -0.187*** N/A N/A 
 (-0.82) (-3.54)   
     
CEO 1.912*** 1.830*** 0.957*** 0.872*** 
 (46.93) (45.78) (18.40) (16.09) 
     
Director 1.341*** 1.340*** 1.322*** 1.180*** 
 (35.14) (34.79) (22.76) (19.72) 
     
Surplus Cash 0.201 -0.481*** -0.155 -0.221 
 (1.19) (-3.06) (-0.85) (-1.09) 
     
Leverage -1.170*** -1.081*** -1.022*** -1.022*** 
 (-16.57) (-12.43) (-9.83) (-9.81) 
     
R & D 2.149*** -0.181 -0.281 -0.334 
 (12.81) (-0.88) (-1.10) (-1.29) 
     
Q 0.495*** 0.465*** 0.481*** 0.499*** 
 (56.92) (35.12) (36.12) (36.42) 
     
Firm Risk 3.077*** 1.080*** 2.522*** 2.057*** 
 (31.01) (7.73) (14.30) (10.54) 
     
Board 
Independence 0.172* 0.452*** 0.391*** 0.507*** 
 (1.99) (3.80) (3.11) (3.84) 
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Institutional 
Holdings -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002* 
 (-1.17) (-0.09) (0.81) (1.82) 
     
Log(NetAssets) 1.060*** 1.088*** 0.924*** 1.018*** 
 (126.06) (44.98) (37.37) (31.85) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.47 0.64 0.67 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.062 8.34% 
Manager Fixed Effects 0.350 47.10% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.101 13.82% 
Residual 0.257  
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Table 6 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Board Independence – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing board independence on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 4, Column 2 in Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) 
plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model 
(3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed 
effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark 
specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether 
each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in 
order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of board independence 
explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level 
are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Board Independence 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
LogMVE 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 17.12 8.58 5.24 5.08 
     
Debt 0.037*** -0.010* -0.019** -0.019** 
 6.24 -1.69 -2.53 -2.51 
     
Log(Segments) 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 13.81 10.08 8.40 7.66 
     
FirmAge -0.008*** N/A 0.005*** N/A 
 -13.45  2.73  
     
FirmAge^2 0.000*** N/A -0.000** N/A 
 16.90  -1.97  
     
MTB -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 
 -12.11 -4.21 -1.10 -0.63 
     
R&D 0.093*** 0.021 -0.025 0.014 
 5.07 0.81 -0.85 0.45 
     
RETSTD -0.051*** -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
 -8.44 -3.71 -4.93 -3.94 
     
CEO_Own -0.433*** 0.000 0.012 -0.011 
 -10.35 0.00 0.33 -0.19 
     
Director_Own 0.568*** 0.340*** 0.358*** 0.330*** 
 47.72 31.55 27.70 25.73 
     
FCF 0.144*** 0.024** 0.004 0.004 
 12.32 2.68 0.46 0.45 
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Performance -0.054*** -0.008 -0.013* -0.013* 
 -6.50 -0.77 -1.66 -1.66 
     
Lag(CEO_Chair) 0.049*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 
 23.00 12.04 10.32 8.75 
     
Age 0.000 0.000* 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 0.85 1.82 2.78 2.74 
     
Tenure -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 -3.40 0.05 -0.79 -0.20 
     
Female -0.003 -0.001 N/A N/A 
 -0.99 -0.33   
     
Mover 0.015*** 0.005*** N/A N/A 
 5.84 3.89   
     
CEO 0.071*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 21.10 7.94 4.00 3.51 
     
Director -0.057*** -0.028*** -0.039*** -0.036*** 
 -17.55 -11.25 -11.44 -10.37 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.73 0.73 0.75 
     











  % of R2 attributable  
to the component 
Observable Firm 





Firm Fixed Effects 0.228 27.44% 
 Manager Fixed Effects  0.514 59.70% 
 Year Fixed Effects 0.060 7.22% 
 Residual 0.169  
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Table 7 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Board Size – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing board size on observable managerial and firm characteristics 
and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm attributes.   The 
benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), 
which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 4, Column 1 in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008) plus selected 
observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) adds 
manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed effects 
in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark 
specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether 
each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in 
order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of board size explained.  
Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Board Size 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
LogMVE 0.591*** 0.270*** 0.341*** 0.233*** 
 59.07 14.22 15.70 9.75 
     
Debt 1.217*** 0.031 0.272*** 0.080 
 15.94 0.30 2.55 0.73 
     
Log(Segments) 0.214*** 0.118*** 0.133*** 0.118*** 
 11.85 5.30 5.08 4.40 
     
FirmAge -0.112*** N/A 0.050 N/A 
 -11.81  0.97  
     
FirmAge^2 0.003*** N/A 0.001 N/A 
 16.89  1.30  
     
MTB -0.259*** -0.156*** -0.157*** -0.122*** 
 -24.08 -15.90 -12.08 -9.58 
     
R&D -2.651*** 0.258 0.263 0.151 
 -11.75 0.68 0.66 0.30 
     
RETSTD -1.066*** -0.438*** -0.418*** -0.321*** 
 -13.80 -6.81 -5.02 -4.50 
     
CEO_Own -3.047*** -0.846** -1.660*** -1.137* 
 -5.32 -2.50 -2.86 -1.82 
     
Director_Own -3.142*** -2.248*** -2.332*** -2.177*** 
 -18.72 -14.37 -12.54 -12.10 
     
Age 0.008*** 0.003 0.003 -0.004 
 3.51 1.45 0.51 -0.84 
     
Tenure 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.030*** 0.077*** 
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 5.54 3.41 4.55 8.70 
     
Female 0.240*** 0.027 N/A N/A 
 4.58 0.50   
     
Mover 0.028 0.029 N/A N/A 
 0.88 1.74   
     
CEO -0.455*** -0.141*** -0.320*** -0.277*** 
 -9.83 -5.17 -6.97 -6.16 
     
Director 0.434*** 0.093*** 0.167*** 0.319*** 
 10.54 3.81 3.60 6.77 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.79 0.78 0.80 
     











  % of R2 attributable  
to the component 
Observable Firm 





Firm Fixed Effects 0.270 30.82% 
 Manager Fixed Effects  0.460 52.50% 
 Year Fixed Effects 0.016 1.82% 
 Residual 0.124  
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Table 8 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Board Leadership – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing board leadership (i.e., CEO/Chair duality) on observable 
managerial and firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved 
manager and firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a logistic regression, without firm 
or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 4, Column 3 in Linck, Netter, and 
Young (2008) plus selected observable managerial attributes.  Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects, and Model 
(5) is a linear probability model (LPM) with both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed effects in all 
specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark specification, 
but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   
Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (5) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify 
the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of board leadership explained.  Refer to the 
Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  




















 Firm & 
Manager FE 
LogMVE 0.340*** 0.175*** 0.306*** 0.135 0.025*** 
 26.22 3.02 4.18 1.40 4.11 
      
MTB -0.224*** -0.110*** -0.228*** -0.118*** -0.011*** 
 -15.51 -3.47 -5.49 -2.42 -3.25 
      
R&D 0.167 0.841 1.448 2.837* 0.184* 
 0.24 0.55 1.22 1.89 1.80 
      
RETSTD -0.624*** -0.343 -0.357 -0.288 0.006 
 -5.84 -1.21 -1.07 -0.75 0.27 
      
Performance -0.497*** -1.384*** -1.509*** -1.261*** -0.059*** 
 -4.14 -5.33 -4.87 -3.10 -2.90 
      
Age 0.002 0.011** 0.016 0.016 0.003 
 0.45 2.36 0.77 0.50 0.52 
      
Tenure 0.002 -0.000 0.017 0.002 0.001 
 0.19 -0.00 0.85 0.33 0.62 
      
Female 0.242*** 0.070 N/A N/A N/A 
 2.88 0.51    
      
Mover 0.145*** -0.023 N/A N/A N/A 
 3.73 -0.33    
      
CEO 0.155** 0.097 0.080 0.190 0.002 
 2.74 1.11 0.41 1.04 0.18 
      
Director -0.008 -0.301*** -0.990*** -0.834*** -0.079*** 
 -0.00 -3.44 -5.73 -4.54 -4.55 
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Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.48 
      











  % of R2 attributable  
to the component 
Observable Firm 





Firm Fixed Effects 0.202 31.08% 
 Manager Fixed Effects  0.363 55.85% 
 Year Fixed Effects 0.020 3.08% 
 Residual 0.350  
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Table 9 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Bidder Dummy – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing bidder dummy on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The dependent variable is one if the firm announces a bid in year t and zero otherwise.  The benchmark 
specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a probit regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on 
the explanatory variables in Table III, Column 3 in Harford (1999) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   
Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, Model (4) 
includes both firm and manager fixed effects, and Model (5) is a linear probability model (LPM) with both firm and 
manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values 
for RHS variables included in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and 
age by using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (5) 
of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in 
determining the portion of bidder dummy explained.   Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity 
robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  




















 Firm & 
Manager FE 
Abnormal return 0.024* 0.018* 0.018* 0.015* 0.003*** 
 1.89 1.64 1.58 1.84 5.90 
      
Sales growth 0.511*** 0.420*** 0.251** 0.275*** 0.022*** 
 17.87 9.54 2.87 2.70 3.27 
      
Noncash 
working capital 0.357*** 0.105 0.001 0.007 0.020 
 2.48 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.94 
      
Leverage -1.118*** -2.360*** -4.596*** -4.279*** -0.182*** 
 -18.07 -17.85 -15.41 -13.00 -10.79 
      
Market-to-book 0.067*** 0.094*** 0.227*** 0.155*** 0.024*** 
 41.34 8.70 27.48 6.18 11.77 
      
Price-to-earnings 0.021*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.002** 
 3.98 -3.41 -3.83 -2.99 -2.13 
      
Size 0.186*** 0.270*** 0.220*** 0.789*** 0.067*** 
 25.19 8.80 4.17 28.79 13.50 
      
Manager's delta 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 3.10 1.68 0.35 0.68 2.61 
      
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.005 0.003 
 -1.08 0.44 -0.97 0.56 0.59 
      
Tenure 0.001 -0.000 0.045*** 0.011 0.005 
 1.09 -0.29 3.73 0.48 1.08 
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Female -0.034 -0.041 N/A N/A N/A 
 -0.55 -0.69    
      
Mover 0.009 -0.058 N/A N/A N/A 
 0.86 -1.03    
      
CEO 0.011 0.020 -0.020 0.009 0.001 
 0.15 0.25 -0.31 0.22 0.29 
      
Director -0.085** -0.068 -0.279** -0.097 -0.019 
 -1.94 -1.18 -2.55 -1.11 -1.20 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.38 
      











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.189 36.14% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.303 57.93% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.004 0.76% 
Residual 0.477  
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Table 10 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Target Dummy – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing bidder dummy on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The dependent variable is one if the firm is announced to be a target of a successful tender offer, merger 
proposal, or merger agreement in year t and zero otherwise.  The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a 
probit regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 3, 
Column 1 in Comment and Schwert (1995) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed 
effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, Model (4) includes both firm and 
manager fixed effects, and Model (5) is a linear probability model with both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (5) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of target dummy explained.   Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  




















 Firm & 
Manager FE 
Poison pill 0.131*** -0.461** -0.207 -0.641** -0.010 
 2.81 -2.38 -0.75 -2.42 -1.39 
      
Control share law -0.277*** 0.073 -0.344*** -0.112 -0.002 
 -5.80 0.00 -3.76 -0.05 -0.13 
      
Business 
combination law -0.054 0.319 1.087 -0.094 0.005 
 -0.79 0.40 1.38 -0.05 0.19 
      
Abnormal return 0.381** 0.322*** 0.385*** 0.434*** 0.040** 
 2.14 2.60 2.99 3.15 2.73 
      
Sales growth -0.000 -0.381 -0.599* -0.487 -0.011** 
 -0.00 -1.10 -1.87 -1.09 -2.48 
      
Liquidity 0.035** 0.573*** 0.670*** 0.822*** 0.051*** 
 3.11 6.48 5.51 5.12 3.87 
      
Debt/equity 0.051 -0.431 -0.874 -1.461 -0.000 
 0.48 -0.86 -1.14 -1.18 -0.04 
      
Market-to-book -0.044** -0.591*** -0.561*** -0.596*** -0.005*** 
 -2.53 -6.71 -4.70 -4.78 -4.65 
      
Price/earnings 0.001 -0.015* -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
 0.82 -1.84 -0.00 -0.66 -0.73 
      
Size -0.107*** -0.290 -0.441** -0.071 -0.001 
 - 85 - 
 -7.76 -1.59 -2.17 -0.25 -0.91 
      
Age 0.001 0.004 -0.004 -0.015 0.000 
 0.12 0.19 -0.20 -0.12 0.51 
      
Tenure -0.006 0.012 0.071 0.024 -0.000 
 -1.24 1.09 1.14 0.10 -0.27 
      
Female 0.181*** 0.246* N/A N/A N/A 
 3.17 1.80    
      
Mover 0.155*** -0.117 N/A N/A N/A 
 3.61 -0.82    
      
CEO 0.050 0.091 -0.119 -0.108 0.000 
 0.31 0.40 -0.28 -0.39 0.12 
      
Director -0.088 -0.061 0.127 -0.141 -0.002 
 -1.29 -0.38 0.24 -0.15 -0.36 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.29 
      











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.165 32.67% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.293 62.34% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.004 0.60% 
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Table 11 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Poison Pill  – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing bidder dummy on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The dependent variable is one if the firm adopts poison pill in year t and zero otherwise.  The benchmark 
specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a probit regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on 
the explanatory variables in Table 3, Column 4 in Comment and Schwert (1995) plus selected observable managerial 
attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, 
Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects, and Model (5) is a linear probability model with both firm and 
manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values 
for RHS variables included in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and 
age by using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (5) 
of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in 
determining the portion of poison pill explained.   Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity 
robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  




















 Firm & 
Manager FE 
Control share law 0.084*** -1.538*** -0.598*** -2.708*** -0.148*** 
 5.57 -7.75 -2.84 -5.36 -5.20 
      
Business 
combination law 0.618*** 1.481*** 4.277*** 5.731*** 0.171*** 
 21.77 7.84 8.41 4.08 7.78 
      
Abnormal return 0.611*** 0.624*** 0.174*** 0.071 -0.025 
 4.64 2.48 2.57 0.42 -0.54 
      
Sales growth -0.194*** -0.068 -0.074 -0.300** -0.031*** 
 -5.80 -1.24 -0.57 -2.19 -2.94 
      
Liquidity -0.076 -0.824*** -0.698* -1.770*** -0.071 
 -1.21 -3.95 -1.74 -2.97 -0.92 
      
Debt/equity -0.000 0.397** 0.789** 0.712* 0.045** 
 -0.07 2.20 2.51 1.91 2.35 
      
Market-to-book -0.086*** 0.015 -0.236*** 0.022 -0.010* 
 -20.74 0.67 -6.16 0.40 -1.71 
      
Price/earnings 0.058*** -0.000 -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005*** 
 30.57 -0.37 -2.92 -3.43 -3.23 
      
Size 0.055*** -0.281*** -0.724*** -0.756*** -0.022*** 
 31.14 -6.79 -7.60 -5.88 -4.02 
      
Age 0.005*** 0.005 0.100 -0.007 0.004* 
 3.76 0.84 1.55 -0.42 1.67 
 - 87 - 
      
Tenure 0.005*** 0.018*** -0.018 0.124*** 0.008** 
 3.54 4.55 -0.96 3.27 2.33 
      
Female -0.087** -0.145** N/A N/A N/A 
 -2.48 -2.20    
      
Mover 0.128*** 0.075 N/A N/A N/A 
 6.24 1.25    
      
CEO 0.120*** -0.134 -0.218 -0.442** -0.020** 
 4.76 -1.27 -1.33 -2.91 -2.48 
      
Director -0.085*** 0.055 0.294* -0.192 -0.012 
 -3.71 0.82 2.04 -0.87 -1.16 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.83 
      











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.500 57.24% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.356 40.60% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.002 0.23% 
Residual 0.123  
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Table 12 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Book Leverage – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate book leverage on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table II, Panel A, Column 3 in Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of book leverage explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Book Leverage 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 




Initial book lev. 0.266*** N/A 0.233*** N/A 
 65.76  21.60  
     
Log(Sales) 0.003*** -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
 5.48 -2.33 0.27 0.30 
     
Market-to-book -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 -20.22 -12.57 -11.05 -11.03 
     
Profitability -0.128*** -0.143*** -0.105*** -0.082*** 
 -18.46 -19.57 -13.29 -10.02 
     
Tangibility 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 
 23.31 10.51 12.74 10.75 
     
Industry median lev. 0.320*** 0.302*** 0.245*** 0.199*** 
 38.47 16.19 14.57 9.16 
     
Dividend payer 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.010 0.005 
 12.41 5.20 0.73 1.27 
     
Cash flow vol. -0.109*** 0.008 -0.049** -0.040** 
 -7.44 0.25 -2.08 -2.01 
     
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 0.56 -0.17 -1.08 0.01 
     
Tenure -0.001*** -0.000** 0.001*** 0.000 
 -6.04 -2.48 2.66 0.27 
     
Female 0.001 -0.000 N/A N/A 
 0.37 -0.30   
     
Mover -0.004* 0.001 N/A N/A 
 - 89 - 
 -1.64 0.55   
     
CEO 0.009*** 0.003 0.003 0.004* 
 3.01 1.48 1.40 1.78 
     
Director -0.003 0.002 0.006* 0.006** 
 -0.74 0.85 1.79 2.03 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.67 0.71 0.74 
     











  % of R2 attributable  
to the component 
 Observable Firm 
 Characteristics 
0.088 10.76% 
 Observable Manager 
 Characteristics 
0.006 0.73% 
 Firm Fixed Effects 0.511 62.47% 
 Manager Fixed Effects 0.209 25.55% 
 Year Fixed Effects 0.004 0.49% 
 Residual 0.182  
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Table 13 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Market Leverage – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate market leverage on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table II, Panel A, Column 6 in Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of market leverage explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-
statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Market Leverage 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 




Initial book lev. 0.265*** N/A 0.250*** N/A 
 67.24  23.30  
     
Log(Sales) 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.024*** 
 20.77 16.45 11.35 15.33 
     
Market-to-book -0.036*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 -59.86 -29.71 -26.94 -24.03 
     
Profitability -0.277*** -0.255*** -0.201*** -0.187*** 
 -39.69 -35.98 -24.63 -22.24 
     
Tangibility 0.063*** 0.027 0.058*** 0.034*** 
 16.43 1.40 6.64 2.89 
     
Industry median lev. 0.390*** 0.509*** 0.429*** 0.408*** 
 47.65 28.65 25.88 18.95 
     
Dividend payer 0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 0.25 4.79 0.57 4.00 
     
Cash flow vol. -0.155*** -0.108*** -0.080*** -0.083*** 
 -10.60 -6.65 -4.15 -4.54 
     
Age -0.000** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 -2.56 -0.58 -0.84 -1.61 
     
Tenure -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 -11.12 -3.24 -1.77 0.60 
     
Female 0.003 -0.000 N/A N/A 
 0.74 -0.08   
 - 91 - 
     
Mover -0.010*** -0.005 N/A N/A 
 -4.26 -1.65   
     
CEO 0.012*** 0.003* 0.004** 0.005 
 4.77 1.70 2.02 1.08 
     
Director -0.006** -0.000 0.009*** 0.000 
 -2.15 -0.48 3.19 0.18 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.74 0.77 0.79 
     











  % of R2 attributable  
to the component 
 Observable Firm 
 Characteristics 
0.191 22.50% 
 Observable Manager 
 Characteristics 
0.001 0.13% 
 Firm Fixed Effects 0.438 51.57% 
 Manager Fixed Effects 0.209 24.62% 
 Year Fixed Effects 0.010 1.17% 
 Residual 0.151  
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Table 14 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Cash Holdings – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate cash holdings on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Column 1 in Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, 
Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include 
year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the 
benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for 
whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-
squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of cash holdings 
explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level 
are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Natural logarithm of the ration of cash holdings to sales 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Gindex -0.030*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.003 
 -12.48 -2.00 -3.78 -0.75 
     
Inside Ownership 2.068*** 0.461*** 0.862*** 0.595*** 
 9.84 3.34 5.84 3.71 
     
Pay sensitivity 0.255*** 0.184*** 0.185** 0.152** 
 3.35 3.64 2.24 2.18 
     
Institutional 
ownership 0.115** 0.005 0.130** 0.084* 
 2.10 0.25 2.28 1.86 
     
Size -0.085* -0.110*** -0.125*** -0.151*** 
 -1.85 -11.24 11.25 -11.31 
     
Leverage -1.558*** -0.262*** -0.392*** -0.196*** 
 -38.79 -7.52 -8.48 -4.45 
     
Market-to-book 0.080*** 0.020*** 0.011* 0.006* 
 15.62 4.48 1.85 1.75 
     
Cash flow 0.657*** 0.184*** 0.347*** 0.318*** 
 9.68 2.74 5.37 4.57 
     
Working capital  -1.491*** -0.637*** -0.681*** -0.482*** 
 -36.70 -12.86 -9.15 -4.88 
     
CF volatility 4.264*** 0.884*** 0.797*** 0.278* 
 28.51 6.20 4.68 1.64 
     
R&D 5.945*** -0.968*** -0.528*** -0.741*** 
 55.76 -7.84 -4.41 -6.93 
 - 93 - 
     
CapEx -3.622*** -1.323*** -1.306*** -1.180*** 
 -26.08 -11.56 -10.16 9.32 
     
Acquisition -2.311*** -1.416*** -1.180*** -1.088*** 
 -22.85 -21.38 -16.28 -16.11 
     
Dividend indicator -0.465*** -0.072*** -0.091*** -0.083*** 
 -32.10 -3.43 -4.82 -4.12 
     
Bond indicator -0.144*** -0.049* 0.009 0.038** 
 -9.74 -1.78 0.35 2.25 
     
Age 0.000 0.000 -0.006* -0.010** 
 0.87 0.51 -1.79 -2.33 
     
Tenure -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.026*** 
 -7.14 -4.74 -6.10 -7.40 
     
Female -0.051* -0.002 N/A N/A 
 -1.69 -0.34   
     
Mover -0.026* -0.011 N/A N/A 
 -1.95 -0.99   
     
Director -0.050*** -0.027** -0.028 -0.028 
 -2.84 -2.35 -1.23 -1.27 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.80 0.80 0.82 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.443 50.97% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.250 28.77% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.021 2.42% 
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Table 15 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Dividend Payout – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate decision to pay dividends (a dummy variable) on 
observable managerial and firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for 
unobserved manager and firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS 
regression, without firm or manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Column 
1 in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Stulz (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed 
effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and 
manager fixed effects, and Model (5) is a linear probability model with both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (5) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of dividend payout explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-
statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A:  




















 Firm & 
Manager FE 
RE/TE 1.685*** -0.025 0.008 -0.035 -0.054 
 6.76 -0.78 0.07 -0.87 -0.38 
      
TE/TA -1.284*** 4.819*** 1.408 6.715*** 0.254*** 
 -24.89 3.54 0.97 3.21 3.90 
      
ROA 4.732*** 1.941*** 1.496* 2.233** 0.081*** 
 21.15 2.90 1.84 2.28 2.77 
      
Sales growth -1.258*** -0.310* -1.194*** -0.855*** -0.030*** 
 -48.71 -1.94 -4.587 -3.17 -3.55 
      
MTB -0.084*** 0.108** 0.283*** 0.254*** 0.005*** 
 -4.48 2.10 4.51 3.97 2.99 
      
Log( assets) 0.463*** 1.173*** 1.320*** 0.924*** 0.040*** 
 80.50 10.34 12.01 4.99 5.95 
      
Age 0.027*** 0.007 -0.011 -0.105 0.000 
 10.84 0.89 -0.14 -1.05 0.10 
      
Tenure 0.021*** 0.125** 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.009*** 
 5.33 2.31 4.78 3.97 3.18 
      
Female -0.134** -0.483*** N/A N/A N/A 
 -2.08 -3.17    
      
Mover -0.038 -0.274 N/A N/A N/A 
 -0.76 -1.28    
      
CEO 0.062 0.089 -0.384 -0.482 -0.002 
 - 95 - 
 0.33 0.14 -1.04 -1.09 -0.57 
      
Director 0.092 -0.025 -0.177 -0.375 -0.024*** 
 1.21 -0.10 -0.94 -1.25 -3.42 
      
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.87 
      











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.622 68.58% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.246 27.12% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.006 0.67% 
Residual 0.093  
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Table 16 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of CAPEX – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate capital expenditure on observable managerial and 
firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and 
firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Panel B, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the 
benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed 
effects.   We include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS 
variables included in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by 
using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel 
A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of CAPEX explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: CAPEX 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Vega -0.008*** 0.006** -0.005* -0.002 
 -3.76 2.24 -1.78 -0.85 
     
Delta 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 4.60 5.58 6.70 6.49 
     
Cash compensation 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 1.21 -2.12 -1.80 -2.25 
     
Log(sales) 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 0.85 4.30 3.19 3.96 
     
Market-to-book 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 9.16 17.20 9.55 9.34 
     
Surplus cash -0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
 -4.46 4.37 3.99 3.71 
     
Sales growth 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 14.74 8.45 4.30 3.23 
     
Stock return -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 -0.90 1.07 -0.25 0.14 
     
Book leverage -0.005* -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 -1.88 -8.41 -4.32 -4.24 
     
Age -0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -2.29 -0.13 0.28 0.05 
     
Tenure 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 5.19 -1.88 -1.09 -0.78 
 - 97 - 
     
Female 0.002** 0.000 N/A N/A 
 2.19 0.13   
     
Mover -0.001 0.003 N/A N/A 
 -0.61 0.92   
     
CEO -0.003*** -0.000 0.001 0.000 
 -3.49 -0.50 1.19 0.62 
     
Director 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 1.85 0.82 0.70 1.33 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.62 0.61 0.63 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.355 47.33% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.312 41.60% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.003 0.40% 
Residual 0.250  
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Table 17 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of R&D – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing corporate R&D investment on observable managerial and 
firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and 
firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 3, Panel A, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the 
benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed 
effects.   We include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS 
variables included in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by 
using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel 
A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of R&D explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered 
at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: R&D 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Vega 0.068*** 0.013* 0.008 0.002 
 19.44 1.58 0.49 0.24 
     
Delta -0.008*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -3.15 -0.26 0.31 0.15 
     
Cash compensation 0.002*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 8.56 -0.78 0.08 -0.02 
     
Log(sales) -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.010 -0.010*** 
 -83.91 -22.80 0.77 -14.60 
     
Market-to-book 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 31.16 18.09 8.74 9.31 
     
Surplus cash 0.189*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.063*** 
 62.90 21.65 25.91 25.29 
     
Sales growth -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 -26.70 -17.47 -15.73 -13.04 
     
Stock return -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 -1.69 -0.23 -0.20 -0.22 
     
Book leverage -0.023*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 
 -13.67 8.76 6.12 6.79 
     
Age -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 -2.80 0.01 -1.74 0.47 
     
Tenure -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 -1.98 -0.79 -0.09 -1.85 
 - 99 - 
     
Female -0.008*** -0.003** N/A N/A 
 -6.99 -1.92   
     
Mover 0.003*** 0.001 N/A N/A 
 5.07 0.85   
     
CEO -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 -0.84 -1.19 -1.24 -1.30 
     
Director -0.007*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 -5.84 0.97 -1.01 -0.78 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.77 0.78 0.80 
     




Relative Importance of Components in Determining R&D 
 
 




  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.442 51.76% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.301 35.20% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.001 0.12% 
Residual 0.145  
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Table 18 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Firm Risk – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing firm stock volatility on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 9, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) 
plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model 
(3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed 
effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark 
specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether 
each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in 
order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of firm risk explained.  
Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Firm Risk 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Vega -0.305*** -0.186*** -0.198*** -0.169*** 
 -8.90 -7.33 -6.28 -5.78 
     
Delta 0.094*** 0.030*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 
 17.55 7.74 8.95 7.39 
     
Cash compensation -0.005** -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.012*** 
 -2.23 -2.83 -3.55 -5.28 
     
Log(sales) -0.192*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.089*** 
 -79.84 -25.13 -27.15 -12.80 
     
Market-to-book -0.025*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 -12.11 -3.84 -6.89 -6.25 
     
R&D 2.652*** 0.469*** 0.429*** 0.311*** 
 55.13 9.42 8.40 4.67 
     
CAPEX 0.620*** -0.054 0.085 0.079 
 10.11 -0.43 1.20 1.13 
     
Book leverage -0.076*** 0.314*** 0.344*** 0.308*** 
 -3.03 19.73 15.14 14.51 
     
Age -0.012** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 -16.07 -0.46 -0.80 -0.39 
     
Tenure -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.018*** -0.022*** 
 -13.79 -6.22 -9.30 -10.42 
     
Female 0.025* -0.001 N/A N/A 
 1.78 -0.29   
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Mover -0.003 0.002 N/A N/A 
 -0.62 0.58   
     
CEO 0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.007 
 0.64 -0.12 0.60 0.73 
     
Director -0.036*** 0.011* 0.051*** 0.017** 
 -2.81 1.99 4.29 2.36 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.81 0.81 0.83 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.397 45.16% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.155 17.63% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.244 27.67% 
Residual 0.121  
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Table 19 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Herfindahl Index – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing company’s Herfindahl index on observable managerial and 
firm characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and 
firm attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or 
manager fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory  variables in Table 4, Panel A, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the 
benchmark model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed 
effects.   We include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS 
variables included in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by 
using indicator variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel 
A to decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of Herfindahl index explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-




Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Herfindahl Index 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Vega -0.051*** 0.025** 0.007 0.013 
 -4.13 2.62 0.33 0.62 
     
Delta 0.010*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.005** 
 4.52 -0.38 2.82 2.14 
     
Cash compensation -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 -3.65 5.97 5.38 5.62 
     
Log(sales) -0.045*** -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 -41.60 -36.97 -35.63 -25.97 
     
Market-to-book 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 20.38 5.56 6.41 5.83 
     
ROA 0.041*** 0.131*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 
 5.73 13.26 6.07 7.71 
     
Stock return -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.002 
 -3.83 -3.37 -1.42 -1.01 
     
Sales growth 0.028*** -0.008 -0.000 -0.007** 
 6.23 -0.71 -0.13 -2.11 
     
Dividend cut -0.074*** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.003 
 -27.72 -2.37 -2.85 -0.99 
     
CEO turnover -0.000 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 -0.25 -2.74 -2.79 -2.92 
     
Book leverage -0.044*** -0.080*** -0.047*** -0.060*** 
 - 103 - 
 -5.54 -11.91 -5.96 -7.01 
     
Age -0.001** -0.000 0.000 0.001* 
 -10.74 0.78 0.66 1.62 
     
Tenure -0.001*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 
 -5.86 -0.99 -3.93 -1.31 
     
Female 0.046*** 0.002 N/A N/A 
 8.37 0.46   
     
Mover -0.021*** -0.005 N/A N/A 
 -5.24 -0.50   
     
CEO -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 -0.36 -1.05 -0.69 -0.52 
     
Director 0.030*** 0.008 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 5.82 0.68 4.70 2.79 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.73 0.75 0.79 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.390 45.72% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.320 37.51% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.030 3.52% 
Residual 0.147  
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Table 20 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Business Segments – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing Ln(segments) on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 4, Panel B, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) plus selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark 
model, Model (3) adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We 
include year fixed effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included 
in the benchmark specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator 
variables for whether each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to 
decompose model R-squared in order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the 
portion of Ln(segments) explained.  Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Ln(segments) 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
Vega 0.125*** -0.016 0.044* 0.030 
 3.68 -0.67 1.51 0.96 
     
Delta -0.031*** 0.004 -0.013*** -0.011 
 -5.39 1.15 -2.94 -1.29 
     
Cash compensation 0.016*** -0.007*** -0.005* -0.006*** 
 6.61 -3.22 -1.84 -4.06 
     
Log(sales) 0.112*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 
 52.41 30.97 28.21 18.82 
     
Market-to-book -0.047*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 -22.20 -2.18 -4.62 -3.96 
     
ROA -0.212*** -0.281*** -0.145*** -0.140*** 
 -9.88 -8.30 -5.14 -5.34 
     
Stock return 0.006** 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 2.16 1.08 0.74 0.50 
     
Sales growth -0.042*** 0.028*** 0.012** 0.025*** 
 -4.10 4.43 2.11 3.44 
     
Dividend cut 0.176*** 0.001 0.011** 0.001 
 27.76 0.82 2.17 0.91 
     
CEO turnover 0.003 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 0.43 2.91 3.10 3.03 
     
Book leverage 0.130*** 0.228*** 0.127*** 0.145*** 
 7.83 13.82 6.83 7.14 
 - 105 - 
     
Age 0.006*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003* 
 14.14 -1.31 -2.90 -1.91 
     
Tenure 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.000 
 4.84 0.73 3.20 0.28 
     
Female -0.087*** -0.005 N/A N/A 
 -7.59 -0.49   
     
Mover 0.019* 0.008 N/A N/A 
 1.84 0.38   
     
CEO -0.010 0.011 0.005 0.009 
 -0.21 0.68 0.57 1.12 
     
Director -0.045*** -0.009* -0.050*** -0.051*** 
 -5.39 -1.32 -4.47 -4.11 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.73 0.75 0.79 
     




Relative Importance of Components in Determining Ln(segments) 
 
 




  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.380 44.55% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.298 34.84% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.071 8.32% 
Residual 0.147  
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Table 21 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of Tobin’s Q – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing company’s Tobin’s Q on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 4, Panel A, Column 4 in Mehran (1995) plus 
selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) 
adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed 
effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark 
specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether 
each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in 
order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of Tobin’s Q explained.  
Refer to the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
% of managers' 0.725*** 0.223*** 0.183*** 0.170*** 
equity compensation 22.83 8.04 6.55 6.18 
     
Managers' delta 0.381*** 0.058*** -0.062*** -0.059*** 
 28.15 5.76 -3.75 -3.63 
     
% of shares held by all  0.207** 0.129*** 0.084** 0.151*** 
outside blockholders 2.35 4.15 2.12 3.97 
     
% of outside directors -0.374*** 0.010 0.074 0.138** 
 -6.80 0.31 1.48 2.52 
     
R&D/sales 5.328*** 3.010*** 3.002*** 0.992*** 
 35.68 14.51 12.05 3.74 
     
(Inventory+PPE)/assets -0.594*** -1.113*** -0.591*** -0.980*** 
 -8.37 -11.51 -5.19 -8.29 
     
Long-term debt/assets -0.174*** -0.137*** -0.108*** -0.096*** 
 -31.90 -21.23 -15.47 -15.07 
     
Std of % change in  0.103*** -0.570*** -0.391*** -0.429*** 
operating income 5.01 -21.50 -12.11 -15.28 
     
Log of assets 0.028*** -0.723*** -0.352*** -0.634*** 
 5.29 -44.83 -22.32 -30.71 
     
Age -0.010*** -0.009 -0.015** -0.009 
 -6.26 -1.07 -2.55 -0.73 
     
Tenure 0.012** -0.000 -0.010** -0.010* 
 2.49 -0.35 -2.62 -1.69 
 - 107 - 
     
Female 0.054 -0.003 N/A N/A 
 1.60 -0.04   
     
Mover -0.210*** -0.034** N/A N/A 
 -10.12 -2.33   
     
CEO -0.246*** -0.071*** -0.044* -0.005 
 -7.29 -3.18 -1.91 -0.81 
     
Director -0.051 0.050* 0.021 0.093*** 
 -0.80 1.87 0.81 2.96 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.70 0.71 0.74 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.360 43.63% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.397 48.12% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.020 2.43% 
Residual 0.176  
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Table 22 
Observable and Unobservable Determinants of ROA – Connectedness Sample with AKM Method 
 
This table presents the results for specifications regressing company’s ROA on observable managerial and firm 
characteristics and on various combinations of fixed effects that proxy for time and for unobserved manager and firm 
attributes.   The benchmark specification (model (1) in Panel A) is a pooled OLS regression, without firm or manager 
fixed effects (FE), which is based on the explanatory variables in Table 4, Panel B, Column 4 in Mehran (1995) plus 
selected observable managerial attributes.   Model (2) adds firm fixed effects only to the benchmark model, Model (3) 
adds manager fixed effects only, and Model (4) includes both firm and manager fixed effects.   We include year fixed 
effects in all specifications.  We delete observations with missing values for RHS variables included in the benchmark 
specification, but include observations with missing values of tenure and age by using indicator variables for whether 
each is missing.   Panel B uses the coefficient estimates in specification (4) of Panel A to decompose model R-squared in 
order to quantify the relative importance of each class of variable in determining the portion of ROA explained.  Refer to 
the Appendix for variable definitions. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics clustered at the firm level are in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Dependent variable: ROA 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(no firm or manager FE) 
(2) 
Firm FE 
(no manager FE) 
(3) 
Manager FE 
(no firm FE) 
(4) 
Firm & Manager 
FE 
% of managers' 2.267*** 0.436*** 0.287* 0.269 
equity compensation 8.23 2.68 1.70 1.38 
     
Managers' delta 1.009*** 0.243*** 0.122 0.254** 
 9.54 3.58 1.03 2.19 
     
% of shares held by all  1.880*** 0.639*** 0.774*** 0.848*** 
outside blockholders 4.80 3.15 2.93 3.58 
     
% of outside directors 1.882*** 0.437 -0.540 -0.141 
 5.43 0.88 -1.18 -0.44 
     
R&D/sales -22.774*** -9.795*** -20.159*** -18.045*** 
 -19.65 -5.86 -10.06 -9.18 
     
(Inventory+PPE)/assets 6.716*** 1.703** 5.087*** 1.378* 
 22.87 2.47 7.49 1.69 
     
Long-term debt/assets -1.256*** -0.903*** -0.978*** -0.879*** 
 -29.38 -22.52 -22.04 -19.33 
     
Std of % change in  -6.083*** -10.184*** -8.402*** -9.081*** 
operating income -33.25 -50.08 -33.87 -34.20 
     
Log of assets -0.216*** -1.871*** -1.124*** -2.379*** 
 -4.99 -17.42 -10.10 -15.84 
     
Age -0.035*** -0.008 0.031 0.008 
 -3.45 -0.34 0.51 0.49 
     
Tenure 0.068*** -0.002 0.055** 0.079** 
 7.08 -0.26 2.08 2.10 
 - 109 - 
     
Female 0.883*** -0.018 N/A N/A 
 4.53 -0.16   
     
Mover -0.923*** -0.020 N/A N/A 
 -5.50 -0.71   
     
CEO -0.404* 0.048 0.181 0.335* 
 -1.79 0.39 1.10 1.81 
     
Director -0.113 0.001 0.029 0.410* 
 -1.02 0.01 0.43 1.77 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.72 0.73 0.76 
     











  % of R2 attributable  







Firm Fixed Effects 0.429 52.00% 
Manager Fixed Effects  0.244 29.57% 
Year Fixed Effects 0.021 2.54% 
Residual 0.175  
 
 
 
